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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)G).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1) Whether the court below erred in ruling that the option paid to Hardy by the
..., Montgomery's was refundable to the Montgomery's despite the lease agreement
stating the option was non-refundable? See, [R. 317] (The Lease Agreement was
received in evidence, reproductions which are identified as Exhibit 1 in an
Addendum hereto.) [Exhibit lLease Agreement at ,r 36]

ru_ Standard of Review: Correctness on the proper interpretation and application

~

of contract which is a question of law. Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, ,r 16, 30
P. 3d 436.

hl

Preservation in Trial Court: The trial court ruled directly on this issue and
devoted the first portion of its Findings to this issue. See, Findings of Fact, [R.
382 at ,I6; and 383 at ,II] and attached hereto in the Addendum.

2. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Hardy anticipatorily repudiated the option
to purchase the property in July of 2013 even though the Montgomery's were in
default of the lease agreement at the time of the claimed repudiation and the court
finding Hardy's duty to perform the option was suspended?
a) Standard of Review: Correctness on the proper interpretation and application of

~

contract which is a question oflaw. Packv. Case, 2001 UT App 232, ,r 16, 30 P. 3d 436.
b) Preservation in Trial Court: The trial court ruled directly on this issue and devoted
the first portion of its Findings to this issue. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 382-383 at

5
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46;

16]
3) Whether the court below erred in finding the REPC was a binding agreement
enforceable against Hardy, and justifying the refund of the $7,000.00 non-refundable
option payment when the Montgomery's had failed to perform the terms of the option
necessary to exercise the option?
a) Standard of Review: Correctness on the proper interpretation and application of
@

contract which is a question oflaw. Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, ,r 16, 30 P. 3d 436.
b) Preservation in Trial Court: The trial court ruled directly on this issue and devoted the
<@

second part of its opinion to this issue. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 382-383 at 15 and 6].
4) Whether the trial court erred in ruling the REPC was a binding agreement when parties
all testified they intended for the REPC to not be a binding document?
a) Standard of Review: The finding of fact is clearly erroneous. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970
P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998)
b) Preservation in Trial Court: The trial court ruled directly on this issue and devoted the
second part of its Findings to this issue. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 379 at ,I3; 382 at ,IS]
compared to Jeremy Montgomery's testimony [R. 440:4-22] [transcript 40:4-22]; Julie
Montgomery's testimony [R. 451:22-25, 452:l][transcript 51;22-25; 52:1]; Richard
Hardy's testimony [R. 466:12-18] [transcript 66:12-18] and [R. 468:1-25; 469:1-7]
[transcript 68: 1-25; 69: 1-7].
5) Whether the lower court was wrong by ruling that Hardy waived his right to collect
additional rents when the lease agreement contained a non-waiver clause and the case law
cited by the court has been corrected by other case law?

Vjj

6
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a)Standard of Review:

Correctness on the proper interpretation and application of

contract which is a question oflaw. Packv. Case, 2001 UT App 232, ,r 16, 30 P. 3d436.

~

b) Preservation in Trial Court: The trial court ruled directly on this issue. See, Findings of
Fact, [R. 380 at if4; 384 at if2] compare to, [Exhibit 1 Lease Agreement at if30 NonWaiver] See also, Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & LoanAss'n, 857 P.2d 935,942.
6) Whether the lower court erred in calculating late fees when the Montgomery's did not
pay the full amount of rent for any month, the court found late fees not on the full
installment amount but on the partial amount of $700.00, and the Montgomery's did not
pay any rent for the months of November through March? See, Findings of Fact, [R. 380
at if4; 384 at if2] compare to, [Exhibit 1 Lease Agreement at ,r2, 19, 30]
a) Standard of Review:

Correctness on the proper interpretation and application of

contract which is a question oflaw. Packv. Case, 2001 UT App 232, ,r 16, 30 P. 3d 436.
b) Preservation in Trial Court: The trial court ruled directly on this issue. See, Findings of
Fact, [R. 380 at if4; 384 at if2] compare to [Exhibit 1 Lease Agreement at ,r2, 19, 30]
7) Whether the lower court erred in calculating damages when the court ruled the
Montgomery's incurred damages in June and not May when the Montgomery's had only
a partial payment of rent for May?
a)Standard of Review:

Correctness on the proper interpretation and application of

contract which is a question of law. Packv. Case, 2001 UT App 232, 116, 30 P. 3d 436.
b) Preservation in Trial Court: The trial court ruled directly on this issue. See, Findings of
Fact, [R. 384 at if2] (The monthly checks were received in evidence, reproductions which
are identified as Exhibit 3 in an Addendum hereto) [Exhibit 3, Check dated 5-8-13]
7
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~

8) Whether the lower court erred in not awarding Hardy attorney's fees when the lease
agreement specifically entitles Hardy to have his expenses and attorney's fees paid?
[Exhibit 1 Lease Agreement at 123]
a)Standard of Review:

Correctness on the proper interpretation and application of

contract which is a question oflaw. Packv. Case, 2001 UT App 232,116, 30 P. 3d 436.
b) Preservation in Trial Court: The trial court ruled directly on this issue. See, Findings of
Fact, [R. 384 at ljf2,4]

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL

Hardy cites no constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, or rule as determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

(a) Nature of the Case
This matter involves a contract, lease agreement, that provided for an option to
purchase for the Appellees, Montgomery's. The lease began in May of 2013. [Exhibit 1
Lease Agreement at ljfl] Hardy contends the Montgomery's defaulted on the lease
agreement from the outset of the agreement by the Montgomery's failing to pay rent on
time, pay additional rent, pay late fees and damages called for in the lease agreement.
[Exhibit 3, Checks]; [Exhibit 1 Lease Agreement at 12, 19]. Hardy also contends that the
option was contingent on the Montgomery's not being in default. See, Findings of Fact,
[R. 382 at ljf6] and [Exhibit 1 Lease Agreement at 13 6] The lower court found the
Montgomery's to be in default, suspending Hardy's obligation to hold the option for the

I.iii

8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Montgomery's. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 382 at if6]The lower court also found Hardy
- entitled to late fees accruing in June of 2013. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 380-381 at ,Il;
384 at ,I2] Despite the Montgomery's default creating a suspension that would excuse
Hardy's performance of the option, the lower court contrarily found Hardy anticipatorily
repudiated on the option agreement in July of 2013. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 3 82 at ,I6]
The lower court also found despite the Montgomery's not exercising the option that the
REPC was an enforceable contract that Hardy repudiated. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 3 82
at ,rs] The parties all provided testimony the REPC was not intended to be binding, but
the terms of purchase of the property were to be agreed upon at a later time. See, Findings
of Fact, [R. 379 at ,J3; 382 · at
440:4-22]

,rs]

[transcript 40:4-22];

compared to Jeremy Montgomery's testimony [R.
Julie

Montgomery's

testimony

[R.

451:22-25,

452:l][transcript 51;22-25; 52:1]; Richard Hardy's testimony [R. 466:12-18] [transcript
66:12-18] and [R. 468:1-25; 469:1-7] [transcript 68:1-25; 69:1-7].
Due to the claimed repudiation of Hardy, the lower court found the Montgomery's were
entitled to a refund of what the lease deemed was a non-refundable $7,000.00 option
payment. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 383 at ifl; 384 at ,J2] [Exhibit I Lease Agreement at ii
36] Hardy contends no valid contract to purchase existed since the Montgomery's had

failed to exercise the option by defaulting on the lease agreement. Hardy also argued that
the language of the lease is clear stating the option payment is a "non-refundable option
payment" which refund denies Hardy a major benefit of the agreement.
The lower court also found Hardy waived his right to the collection of additional
rent as outlined in the lease agreement. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 380 at ,J4] Hardy
9
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contends the non-waiver provision of the lease agreement protects his right to collect
additional rent. [Exhibit 1 Lease Agreement at if30]

Hardy also contends the court

incorrectly calculated late fees and damages as the Montgomery's could not have paid
rent on time when the amount paid was deficient by the full amount called for under the
lease agreement. [Exhibit 1 Lease Agreement at if2, 19] Late fees should be calculated
for every month as the Montgomery's did not ever pay the full monthly installment on
time for any month.

Additional late fees should be calculated on the full monthly

installment of$800.00. Id. at if2. Damages should begin to accrue in May of 2013.
(b) Course of Proceedings
Hardy filed this suit on the 15 th of May 2014 arguing that the Montgomery's
defaulted on the terms of the lease agreement by failing to pay rent for the months of
November through March, failed to pay late fees, damages, and additional rent accruing
for the entire term of the lease agreement.
On October 16, 2014 Hardy filed for Partial Summary Judgment alleging that facts
related to the contract and the Montgomery's performance was uncontested. Despite the
Montgomery's not contesting any of Hardy's facts, the trial court found that the issue of
the REPC being a binding agreement with respect to the option to purchase was an issue
requiring a trial.
(c) Disposition in the trial court
A bench trial occurred on October 2, 2015. [R. 315-316] All parties were present
and represented by counsel.

On November 17, 2015 the trial court issued a

Memorandum Decision. [R. 318-326] On February 5, 2016 the lower court entered

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment identical to the Memorandum
Decision. [R. 375-387] The trial court's decision ignored the plain language of the. lease

~

agreement including language stating the $7,000.00 option was non-refundable, rent was
paid in addition to the option not substituted for the option, additional rent was owed to
Hardy, a non-waiver clause in the lease agreement preserving all of Hardy's claims, and
miscalculation of late fees and damages. Hardy filed for appeal on February 16, 2016.
Gf;J

[R. 382-393]
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Many of the facts are not in serious dispute in this matter. Hardy argues the Real

~

Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) is immaterial as it was not binding since the
Montgomery's never exercised the option to purchase the property however this was a
contested fact. However for good measure this was a contested fact by the parties and the
court. The court below found "First, Hardy urges the court to ignore the REPC and to
only consider the Lease, claiming that the parties agreed the REPC was not binding. The
court did not hear testimony or receive other evidence of any such agreement." See,
Findings of Fact, [R. 3 79 at ,13] Hardy below shows testimony by all three parties that
the REPC was not intended to be binding or a part of the lease agreement, but the terms
of sale were to be negotiated at a later time. Jeremy Montgomery's testimony [R. 440:422] [transcript 40:4-22]; Julie Montgomery's testimony [R. 451:22-25, 452:l][transcript
51;22-25; 52:1]; Richard Hardy's testimony [R. 466:12-18] [transcript 66:12-18] and [R.
468:1-25; 469:1-7] [transcript 68:1-25; 69:1-7].

11
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~

Another fact at issues is the lower court's finding that the "Lease is silent as to the
right to cure the default ... " The Lease Agreement states that if "Tenant fails to pay rent
when due and the default continues for seven (7) days thereafter... Landlord ... may
immediately terminate this Agreement." [Exhibit 1 Lease Agreement at 120]
Hardy also contends the courts finding that Hardy anticipatorily repudiated on his
obligation to sell the property to the Montgomery's when it is clear from the letter sent by
Hardy in September, Hardy still intended on holding the property for the Montgomery's
benefit so that they could purchase the property. (A letter was received in evidence,
Cj

·

reproductions which are identified as Exhibit 4 in an Addendum hereto.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

Hardy's argument is the lower court selectively chose the language of the lease
agreement between the parties and did not enforce the majority of provisions that would
benefit Hardy. The court erred in refunding the option payment to the Montgomery's
Cd)

when the lease agreement is clear that it is a "non-refundable option payment ... "."
[Exhibit 1 at 136]

The lower court was incorrect to hold that the Montgomery's

unilaterally could decide that the option payment was no longer a good deal for them as a
result of their default and that the Montgomery's were correct to apply the nonrefundable option payment to rent. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 378 at 122] The lower court
was incorrect to determine that Hardy anticipatorily repudiated the option to purchase the
property when Hardy was only enforcing his right~ under the contract by insisting the
Montgomery's were in default thus disqualifying themselves from exercising the option.

See, Findings of Fact, [R. 377 at ,I9-11; 380 at 14, 1; 381 at ,Il; 382 at 16; ·384 at ,I2-3;
12
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387] It makes very little sense to insist that even though the Montgomery's were in
default, Hardy should be required to sell and finance the property for the Montgomery's

~

who established a clear pattern that they had no intention of following the terms of the
lease agreement. See [Exhibit I at ,r2, 19, 36] (A check for JW1e was received in evidence,
reproductions which are identified as Exhibit 2 in an Addendum hereto.) [Exhibit 2] and
[Exhibit 3]. The lower court also erred in ruling that Hardy waived his right to collect
additional rent the Montgomery's paid, especially when the lease contains a non-waiver
provision. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 380 at if4] [Exhibit I at if30] The lower court also
erred in calculating late fees and damages. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 380-381 at ,r1, 384

~

at if2] [Exhibit I at ,r2, 19]
Hardy should be placed in the same position as he would be in if the parties had
fulfilled their obligations under the lease agreement. Under the lease agreement Hardy
would have received $7,000.00 for the non-refundable option payment and $800.00 in
rent for the eleven (11) months the Montgomery's rented the premises or a total benefit
of $15,800. [Exhibit 1 at ,r2, 19, 36]

This calculation does not include late fees or

damages the lower court found Hardy was entitled to receive. See, Findings of Fact, [R.
380-381 at ,rI]. Under the court's calculation Hardy is entitled to late fees of $140.00,
damages in the amoW1t of $2,420.00. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 380-381 at ,II, 384 at if2]
The lower court then finds that Hardy is entitled to rent of only $6,550.00 and he must
refund the $7,000.00 option to the Montgomery's resulting in a liability to Hardy of
$1,990.00. Id. 384 at ,r2. This is clearly at odds with what Hardy bargained for as the
parties agreed the rent would be in addition to the option, and the option could not
13
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~

substitute the rent payments, late fees, additional rents, or damages. [Exhibit 1 at ,I2, 19,
36]. Hardy is punished for the Montgomery's failing to exercise the option by the
Montgomery's own default. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 382 at ,I6] Hardy should be
granted the benefit of what he should have received under the terms of the contract.
Hardy is entitled to retain what the lease agreement states is a non-refundable option
payment. [Exhibit 1 at ,I3 6]

The lower court decision should be reversed with

calculations for rent being at $800.00/ month, late fees for every month since the
Montgomery's never paid the full amount of rent owed, and damages accruing in May
also based on the Montgomery's failing to pay the full amount of rent owed and paying
late. [Exhibit 1 at ,I2, 19, 20,30]
ARGUMENTS

The basis for Hardy's challenge is almost exclusively on the terms of the lease
agreement which as a matter of law the lower court erred. The lower court erred by
Cj

refunding the Montgomery's the $7,000.00 option payment the lease stated was non-·
refundable. [Exhibit 1 at ,J36]
HARDY COULD NOT ANTICIP ATORILY REPUDIATE THE OPTION AGREEMENT ON
WHICH THE MONTGOMERY'S HAD ALREADY DEFAULTED

I.

Hardy did not anticipatorily repudiate the option agreement because the time
fixed for his perfonnance never occurred.
The lower court found that even though the Montgomery's were in default,

suspending Hardy's obligation to perform the option agreement, Hardy refused to
perform his part of the option to sale the property. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 382 at ,I6]

14
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While it does not make any sense that the lower court would find Hardy be excused
(suspended obligation) from performing the option as a result of the Montgomery's
default, nevertheless the lower court used-Hardy's claimed refusal to justify a finding that
Hardy anticipatorily repudiated the contract. The lower court then ordered the
Montgomery's be refunded the "non-refundable $7,000.00 option payment" despite the
Montgomery's being in default at the time and disqualifying them from exercising the
option anyway. This finding however is at odds with the Court of Appeals finding in

Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, when this Court stated, "An anticipatory breach occurs
when a party to an executory contract manifests a positive and unequivocal intent to not

render its promised performance when the time fzxedfor it in the contract arrives."
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe 799 P.2d 716, citing Hurwitz v. David K Richards Co.,
20 Utah 2d 232,436 P.2d 794, 796 (1968) In this case, Mr. Hardy's promised
performance was to hold his property for the Montgomery's to purchase. [Exhibit 1 at
136]. Hardy's time for the performance was to occur when the Montgomery's were not
in default of the terms of the lease agreement and sometime after September 15, 2013.

Id. Since the Montgomery's defaulted on the terms of the lease agreement, Mr. Hardy
could not have repudiated on the contract because his time for performance was never
triggered by the date in September nor the performance of the Montgomery's. It is also
important to point out that due to the Montgomery's default, Hardy, according to the
terms of the lease agreement had the ability to terminate the entire agreement. [Exhibit 1
at 12, 20]

Rather Hardy tried to encourage the Montgomery's to perform by paying the

15
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Gw

promised late fees, damages, and other obligations they were failing to fulfill so that he
could still sell the property to them. [Exhibit 4].
A closer analysis however reveals that the Montgomery's are likely the party that
anticipatorily breached the contract. The Montgomery's did not pay the full amount of
rent called for in the lease agreement starting with the first month of May. [Exhibit 3].
They paid partial payments of $700.00, deficient by $100.00. Id. The additional rent of
~

$100.00 called for in the lease agreement was to cover Hardy's expenses for insurance
and taxes. [Exhibit 1 at ,r2, 19]. This additional rent clause also called for the
Montgomery's to acquire an additional insurance policy and provide Hardy with proof of
the policy naming Hardy as one of the beneficiaries. Id at ,rt9. The Montgomery's never
~

provided proof of acquiring the additional insurance policy. Jeremy Montgomery's
testimony [R. 416:15-25] [transcript 16:15-25]. Hardy asserts that this failure to pay the
full amount of rent in May triggers late fees and damages accruing in May rather than in
June, despite the lower court's ruling Hardy waived this right to additional rent which is
contrary to the non-waiver clause of the lease agreement. [Exhibit 1 at ,r2, 19, 30] The
lower court found that the Montgomery's paid June's rent late which triggered a late fee
of 10% of the total monthly installment. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 380-381 at ,rI]
[Exhibit 1 at ,I2]. The Montgomery's never paid the late fee. Id. at 380-381 at ,Il. The
Montgomery's also triggered a liquidated damages fee in June that required the
Montgomery's to pay $10.00/ day until they had paid all rent and late fees in full. Id. The
Montgomery's never paid damages for a single day. The lease agreement states that
tenant shall "not cause or permit any locks or hooks to be placed upon any door or
16
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window without the prior written consent of Landlord." [Exhibit 1 at 11 l(f)]. The
Montgomery's changed the locks without Hardy's written consent. Jeremy
Montgomery's testimony [R. 427:9-25; 428:1] [transcript 27:9-25; 28:1] Given the
Montgomery's were in default of multiple obligations of the lease agreement from the
outset of the agreement establishes a solid argument that the Montgomery's
unequivocally or unambiguously intended that they were not going to perform their
promises during the time they were supposed to perform them. The Montgomery's
defaults make a strong argument that the Montgomery's were the party to anticipatorily
repudiate the lease agreement. Despite the Montgomery's defaults, Hardy encouraged
the Montgomery's to perform their obligations, including a letter stating the
Montgomery's should perform, and that they could still purchase the property. [Exhibit
4] "An innocent party, confronted with an anticipatory repudiation, may continue to treat
the contract as operable and urge performance by the repudiating party without waiving
any right to sue for that repudiation." Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe 799 P.2d 716, 725
citing United California Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co., Etc., 140 Ariz. 238, 681 P.2d 390,
433 (Ct. App. 1983) In this instance, that is exactly what Hardy did. Hardy asked that
the Montgomery's perform their obligations under the contract. Id Unfortunately the
lower court erroneously used the letter sent by Hardy as evidence to be used against him
even though the letter stated the Montgomery's could still exercise the option to purchase
the property and urged their performance. "A party that has received a definite
repudiation from the breaching party to the contract should not be penalized for its efforts
to encourage the breaching party to perform its end of the bargain." Breuer-Harrison,
17
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Inc. v. Combe 799 P.2d 716, 725. Unfortunately the lower court penalized Hardy for his
efforts to encourage the Montgomery's perform their end of the bargain by refunding the

"non-refundable $7,000.00 option payment," citing the letter as evidence that Hardy
waived his right to collect additional rent, and refusing Hardy the benefit of the lease
agreement which called for payments of rent for the months the Montgomery's remained
in possession of the property from November-March 2014. See, Findings of Fact, [R.
380 at ,I4] [Exhibit 1 at ,I2, 15, 19, 30, 36]
The lower court is wrong in finding Hardy anticipatorily repudiated the agreement,
however, even if the claim was valid, the letter sent to the Montgomery's in September
clearly states the Montgomery's have the ability to exercise the option and purchase the
property. [Exhibit 4]. "The repudiating party has a power of retraction as long as there
has been no substantial change of position by the injured party and the nonbreaching
party's continuing to urge performance may be properly held to keep this power of
~

retraction alive. Id. citing 4 Corbin§ 981 at 939. If Hardy was the repudiating party, the
letter in September is clear that Hardy retracted any statement the lower court found to

Gu

infer Hardy was unwilling to allow the Montgomery's to exercise the option to purchase
the property. The Montgomery's position had not changed as they were still living in
Hardy's home. The lower court's argument is likely one in which Hardy is obligated to
finance the purchase of the home, however, given the parties all agreed they did not come
to a meeting of the minds on Hardy financing the agreement or the REPC, the only
obligation Hardy had was to allow the Montgomery's to purchase the property as

18
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outlined in the lease agreement. The analysis under this scenario is further skewed
because the Montgomery's are clearly not the nonbreaching party.
THE REPC IS

IMrvlATERIAL BECAUSE THE MONTGO1\1ERY'S NEVER

PERFORMED THE NECESSARY CONSIDERATION TO EXERCISE THE OPTION
I.

The Montgomery's chose not to exercise the option by failing to perform all of
the necessary consideration to make the REPC an enforceable contract.

The lower court treats the REPC as a binding contract in which Hardy must sell the

GiiJ

property to the Montgomery's rather than an option in which the Montgomery's can
decide to purchase the property by performing their obligations under the lease agreement
While an option to purchase, if based upon a sufficient consideration, binds the party
granting it, it is not a contract ofpurchase, but simply a contract granting to the
holder of the option the privilege of purchasing, and binds the party by whom it is
given to sell and convey the property involved, upon the acceptance of the option in

accordance with the terms, and the compliance on the part of the acceptor with its
requirements. There is no contract ofpurchase, or any obligation to sell and convey,
un:fil the option is accepted and performed, or tender of performance by the holder is
made in proper time. Until then there is no contract between the parties which can be

specifically enforced. Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Co., 28 Utah 173, 180; 77 P.
758, 760.
The Supreme Court of Utah is clear in Tilton that until the option is exercised by the
Montgomery's, the REPC cannot be enforced against Hardy. In order for the REPC to be
enforced against Hardy the Montgomery's must comply " ... on the part of the acceptor
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with its requirements." Id. One of the requirements for the Montgomery's to exercise the
option was that they not be in default with the terms of the agreement. [Exhibit 1 at ,I36]
The lease agreement specifically states, "Provided Tenant is not in default hereunder,
Tenant shall have the right to purchase ("Option") the Premises ... at any time after
September 15, 2013 and before the end of the Term of the Lease." Id. So the question is
whether the Montgomery's adequately tendered performance to make the REPC a
binding agreement to be enforced against Hardy.
The lease agreement states under the clause titled "Default" that
"If Tenant fails to pay rent when due and the default continues for seven (7) days

thereafter, Landlord may, at Landlord's option, declare the entire balance of rent
payable hereunder to be immediately due and payable and may exercise any and all
rights and remedies available to Landlord at law or in equity or may immediately
terminate this Agreement." [Exhibit 1 at if20].
The lower court found that the Montgomery's paid rent in June on the 19th citing a check
dated June 19, 2013. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 380-381 at ifl]; [Exhibit 2]. The lower
court however perverts the conclusion by stating "Though the Lease at paragraph 20
defines the default, the Lease is silent as to the right to cure the default." See, Findings of
Fact, [R. 382-383 at 11] Clearly the default provision, see above states Hardy has the
remedy of immediately terminating the Agreement.
Ironically the lower court finds that "a default only suspends the non-defaulting
party's performance ... " Id. The lower court also finds, ''the Montgomery's had the right
to cure the default." Id.

By the lower court's logic, Hardy at the time was suspended
20
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from having to perform his obligations under the lease agreement to hold the option for
the Montgomery's because of the Montgomery's default. Id.

Yet Hardy is charged with

anticipatorily repudiating the option agreement when he refused to perform the very
obligation the lower court found Hardy ''was suspended from having to perform." Id.
Again with the lower court's circular logic. If Hardy is excused from performing his
obligation under the option, by the lower court's own admission he cannot be required to
perform his obligation under the option agreement. It cannot be possible to repudiate on
an obligation that you do not have to perform! The lower court instead tries to justify
Hardy's performance based on a what if scenario where the Montgomery's cured their
default, but that's not the facts of the case, the Montgomery's never did cure their default.
Similar to Coulter & Smith v. Russell, the Montgomery's failed in providing sufficient
consideration which relieved Hardy from his obligation to perform. The Supreme Court
in Coulter stated, "If consideration fails because one party fails to perform, the other
party's performance cannot be compelled." Coulter & Smith v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852,
860. It would be unfair to require Hardy to perform his obligation of holding the option
open despite the Montgomery's failing to perform the requisite consideration as agreed
by the parties.
II.

The option to purchase was contingent on the Montgomery's performance of
the terms of the lease.
The lease agreement states that the Montgomery's could purchase the property,

"Provided Tenant is not in default hereunder, Tenant shall have the right to purchase the
Premises ... " [Exhibit 1 at ,I36] See, Findings of Fact, [R. 382-383 at ,I6 "if they were not

21
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iJ

~

in default."]. The option clause of the lease agreement specifically states that the
Montgomery's cannot default on the lease agreement if they want to exercise the option
to purchase the property. "When the optionee decides to exercise his option he must act
unconditionally and precisely according to the terms of the option. Actual exercise of the
option must be in accordance with its terms." Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70
citing Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P .2d 638, 640 (Utah
4j

1984) (quoting Williston on Contracts§ 61D (3d ed. 1957)) The lower court states in its
findings that the Montgomery's were in default of the lease agreement. See, Findings of
Fact, [R. 382-383 at ,I6] The lower court also awarded Hardy late fees and damages as a
result of the Montgomery's default. Id. at 380 ,fl. According to Geisdorf, the lower
court is wrong to assert that Hardy anticipatorily repudiated the option agreement when it
is clear the Montgomery's did not act ''unconditionally and precisely according to the
terms of the option." Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70
The lower court is wrong to find Hardy anticipatory repudiated the option when
the claimed repudiation occurred after the Montgomery's failure to adhere to the terms of
the option which required the Montgomery's not to default on the lease agreement. "In
other words, although substantial compliance is sufficient for bilateral contracts,
performance of an option requires strict compliance." Id. at 71. Since strict compliance
with the terms of the option is necessary for the option to require Hardy's performance to
sell the property to the Montgomery's, the time for Hardy's performance never arrived.
Hardy obviously had no further obligation to the Montgomery's since it is clear the
Montgomery's never intended on paying Hardy late fees, damages, or addi~ional rent as
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outlined in the lease agreement. [Exhibit 1 at ,r 2, 19]. As stated above in the case law,
until the option is performed, there is no contract for the sale of the property that can be

iJ

enforced against Hardy. Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Co., 28 Utah 173, 180; 77 P.
758, 760.
III.

i)

The Montgomery's received the benefit of the option.
The lower court found that the Montgomery's "decided not to purchase the house"

after receiving a letter from Hardy requesting they comply with the terms of the lease
agreement. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 378 at ,I22]. The fact that the court below found the
Montgomery's made the decision not to purchase the property clearly shows the
Montgomery's enjoyed the benefit of option. The letter from Hardy in September also
shows the Montgomery's received the benefit of the option as Hardy stated in the letter,
that Hardy would still hold the property for the Montgomery's to purchase the property.
[Exhibit 4].
IV.

The court below erred by finding that Hardy should present evidence of a
potential sale (repudiation of the option) in order to retain the option payment
or recover damages.
The lower court claims Hardy anticipatorily repudiated on his obligation to allow

the Montgomery's to exercise the option to purchase the property even though the lower
court's findings that the Montgomerys were in default, Hardy's obligation under the
option was suspended, and the Montgomery's enjoyed the benefit of the option because
''they decided not to purchase the house." See, Findings of Fact, [R. 378 at ,I22; 382-383
at ,I6]. But this is still not enough for the lower court. The lower court suggests that
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Hardy should have presented evidence of repudiation by showing he had engaged others
to purchase the property from him despite the court's claims he was obligated to not sale
the property to anyone else as required under the option. [R. 378 at ifl6; 381 at ,r2; 381382 at if4; 384 at ifl] The lower court states,
"Hardy testified that he ''thought" he lost potential sales of the house, which was
his justification for keeping the $7,000.00 option payment. Hardy did not point to
a specific buyer or buyers he may have had for the house ... without any evidence
of a potential sale, Hardy is merely speculating that he may have been able to sell
the house ... Accordingly, the court cannot find that Hardy suffered damages for
lost sales." Id. 3 81 at ,r2.
The lower court's analysis is completely wrong and contradictory of its own
findings and conclusions. In order for an option to exist there must be consideration. Part
of the consideration in this matter was the $7,000.00 the parties agreed was nonrefundable. [Exhibit 1]. The other part of the consideration required the Montgomery's to
fulfill their obligation under the lease agreement. "When the optionee decides to exercise
his option he must act unconditionally and precisely according to the terms of the option.
Actual exercise of the option must be in accordance with its terms." Geisdorf v. Doughty,
972 P.2d 67, 70 citing Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d
638, 640 (Utah 1984) (quoting Williston on Contracts§ 61D (3d ed. 1957)) The
Montgomery's never fulfilled their multiple obligations to even be close to produce the
vJ

remaining necessary consideration to exercise the option. It is irresponsible of the lower
court to suggest that parties to an option contract, in order to receive the benefit of the

Vil
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option, should have to present evidence that they in fact breached their obligation of the
option by seeking out other potential buyers. In short the lower court is asking Hardy to
present evidence that he breached the option by seeking out other potential buyers in order
to justify retaining the part of the consideration the Montgomery's paid as a "non-

refundable $7,000.00 option payment." [Exhibit 1 at ,I36] The court's ruling the
Montgomery's were entitled to a refund of the $7,000.00 is wrong and should be reversed.
Hardy is entitled to retain the "non-refundable $7,000.00 option payment." Id.
The Montgomery's understood their obligation was to pay rent in addition to not
in place of the option.
The lower court found that the Montgomery's after ''they received the letter from
Hardy's lawyer that they decided not to purchase the house, and used the $7,000.00 that
they had paid for the option as a credit to cover rent for November, December, January
and two weeks in February." See, Findings of Fact, [R. 378 at ,I22]. The lower court also
concluded, "The checks themselves reveal that only the June and October payments are
late." Id. 380-381 at ,II. The lower court found that the Montgomery's paid rent in
October even though they had received notice from Hardy's lawyer that Hardy did not
want to finance the purchase of the property.

THE PARTIES DID NOT INTEND FOR THE 1ERMS OF THE REPC TO APPLY
The lower court spends a significant amount of time dealing with the REPC to justify
refunding the Montgomery's the "non-refundable $7,000.00 option payment." [Exhibit 1
at if36]. The problem is that the lower court is either clueless, completely negligent in
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reading the agreement, listening to the testimony, and applying principles of legal
doctrine uniformly, or it bears significant bias against Hardy because the lower court's
own findings and conclusions are absolutely contrary to the contract, law, and facts. The
<..j

lower court finds that since the lease agreement is an integrated agreement that references
the REPC, the REPC is in fact a binding agreement upon the parties. See, Findings of
Fact, [R. 379-380 at 13]. The problem is that it gives no effect to the option language of
the lease agreement. The Montgomery's enjoy the benefit of choosing not to purchase
the house and the benefit of the $7,000.00 as if they had exercised the option.
The lower court explains its finding: "First, Hardy urges the court to ignore the
REPC and to only consider the Lease claiming that the parties agreed the REPC was not
binding. The court did not hear testimony or receive other evidence ofany such

agreement." Id. (emphasis added) Hardy would kindly direct this Court's attention to the
testimony given by Jeremy Montgomery, Julie Montgomery, and Richard Hardy. So in
other words Hardy directs attention to the testimony of every individual who was a party
to the lease agreement, all of which testified that they all agreed the REPC was not
binding.
Compare the court's claim with the testimonies:
"First, Hardy urges the court to ignore the REPC and to only consider the Lease
l,d9

claiming that the parties agreed the REPC was not binding. The court did not hear

testimony or receive other evidence ofany such agreement."
Jeremy Montgomery's testimony [R. 440:4-22] [transcript 40:4-22]

Mr .Woodworth asking questions and Jeremy Montgomery answering:
26
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12. Mr. Woodworth: So did you intend for the real estate purchase contract to be
binding? Or until it was signed?
A. Jeremy Montgomery: Until it was signed.

Q. Okay. So it wasn't binding until it was signed. Is that right?

~

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So the real estate purchase contract--A. Is only referenced.
Testimony of Julie Montgomery: Julie Montgomery's testimony [R. 451 :22-25,
452:l][transcript 51;22-25; 52:1].
Mr. Woodworth: Q: With regard to the option, did you understand the real estate
purchase contract to be a binding document or was it intended that the parties
~

would come to an agreement on that later on?
Julie Montgomery: A. That it would be agreed upon later on.
Richard Hardy's testimony [R. 466:12-18] [transcript 66:12-18] and [R. 468:1-25; 469:17] [transcript 68: 1-25; 69: 1-7].

Mr. Clifford: Q. You wanted to make sure Bridge Realty did not receive a
commission. Correct?
Richard Hardy: A. Well, yes. That, that was the issue, yes, yes, I didn't want
them.

Q. Is that why you didn't sign the real estate purchase contract?

A.No.
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Q. Okay.
A. Can I tell you why?
Q. Not right now.
A. Okay
and [R. 468:1-25; 469:1-7] [transcript 68:1-25; 69:1-7]:

Mr. Clifford: Q. And a, did Mark Morley draft the real estate purchase contract as
well as the lease agreement?
Richard Hardy: A. I believe he did.
Q. And a, when you signed the lease agreement did you sign the real estate
purchase contract?
A. Started to but then I stopped.

Q. Why did you stop?
A. I didn't like how it was written.

Q. And you're claiming Mark Morley was your-lawyer. Right?
A. Yes.

Q. And you didn't like the way the personA. When I say written, it's just, it's just a feeling I had just let it go until it was
time for the a, we agreed to let it go, not to sign it until January, you know, first of
January, end of December and I agreed to that, we both agreed to that.

Q. You're saying my client agreed to that?
A. Yes. We, he suggested and I agreed, there was no need to sign it really.
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Q. Now, you said you started reading through it and you felt uneasy?

A. Yes.
Q. What made you feel uneasy about it?
A. I don't know. Just a, just a feeling. It

didn't, first of all it didn't need to be signed so, as I wasn't, you know, in a big
hurry to do it anyway but--Q. Well, didn't my client want you to sign it?
A. No.
Q. You're claiming not?

A. He asked me to, If it would be all right if we waited until the end of
December, first part of January.
These all seem to be significant testimonies the lower court left out of its findings.
Odd since these three witnesses were the only witnesses who gave testimony during the
trial. The real problem is the lower court didn't just leave the testimonies out of its
findings, but the lower court claims these testimonies were not even presented before the
court. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 379-380 at 13]. It is incredible that all the witnesses
unanimously agree the REPC is not binding and that they intended to work out the details
at a later time, compared to the lower court's claim that no testimony was heard about the
REPC being binding. By showing the lower court was at a minimum derelict in its duties
to make correct findings helps illustrates a lower court that is significantly confused and
erratic in its findings. Since all the parties are in agreement that they did not intend for
the REPC to be binding, Hardy could not anticipatorily repudiate an obligation to finance
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the purchase of the property because all parties agree and intended that obligation did not
exist.
HARDY DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COLLECT ADDITIONAL RENTS.
tj

I.

The non-waiver provision of the contract protects Hardy from the lower court's
conclusion that he waived his right to collect additional rent.

~

The lease agreement states in the rent section in bold lettering that the
Montgomery's are required to pay additional rents found in paragraph 17 and 19 beyond
the $700.00 monthly rent. Paragraph 19 states, "Tenant shall pay an amount equal to
$100 per month, as additional Rent, to Landlord to reimburse Landlord for the estimated
prorated property taxes and insurance." [Exhibit 1 at -,r2, 19] Paragraph 19 continues on
requiring the.Montgomery's are required to "provide Landlord a commercial liability
policy, with terms and amounts approved by Landlord, covering the Premises and naming
Landlord as an additional insured, and loss payee. Id
The Montgomery's never paid additional rent of $100.00 for additional rent at any
time. [Exhibit 2] [Exhibit 3] Jeremy Montgomery's testimony [R. 415:16-25; 416:1-25]
[transcript 15:16-25; 16:1-25]. Additionally the Montgomery's never provided Hardy
with a commercial liability policy. Id. Ironically right before the court refuses to enforce
the terms of paragraph 19 requiring the Montgomery's to pay an additional $100.00 of
rent, the court below states, "The court cannot arbitrarily ignore the plain language of
Paragraph 36, and concludes the REPC and addendum are part of the Lease." See,
Findings of Fact, [R. 379-380 at 13]. The court below in the following paragraph then
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goes into an explanation as to why the court is going to ignore the plain language of the
additional rent clause, finding that Hardy waived his right to collect the additional rents
because "Hardy never told the Montgomerys that the rental payment was in the wrong
amount" or because he did not demand it in a letter sent from Hardy's attorney in an
attempt to resolve the parties dispute. Id. 380 at if4; [Exhibit 4]. The court below does
not explain though why the court "arbitrarily ignore(s) the plain language of the lease
agreement in Paragraph 30 titled "NON-WAVIER." [Exhibit I at if30] as contained in
the lease agreement in bold writing as presented here. The non-waiver provision states:
"No indulgence, waiver, election or non-election by Landlord under this
Agreement shall affect Tenant's duties and liabilities hereunder. No failure of
Landlord to enforce any term hereofshall be deemed a waiver, nor ~hall any
acceptance ofa partial payment ofrent be deemed a waiver ofLandlord's right to
the full amount thereof If any term, provision, covenant or restriction of this
Agreement is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, void or
unenforceable, the remainder of the terms, provisions, covenants and restrictions
of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect and shall in no way be
affected, impaired or invalidated." Id
If the lower court cannot ignore the plain language of paragraph 36, it surely
cannot ignore the plain language of paragraph 30 containing the non-waiver provision
which protects Hardy's right to assert all of his rights at any time, including the collection
of additional rent under paragraph 19. Id. Paragraph 30 specifically instructs the lower
court that "No failure" on Hardy's part is to be "deemed a waiver." Id. Unfortunately for
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Hardy, the lower court shows it does "arbitrarily ignore the plain language" of Paragraph
30 and that of the lease agreement. The lower court does nothing to explain why in an
integrated contract, the non-waiver provision is not given effect. Since the lower court
erred and Paragraph 30 cannot be arbitrarily ignored, Hardy's right to collect the
additional rent is enforceable. The lower court's ruling that Hardy waived his right to
collect the additional rent is wrong and should be reversed. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 380
Lfl)

at 14]. Additionally, since the Montgomery's failed to pay the full amount of rent at any
0

time during the lease period, Hardy should be entitled to collect late fees of 10% for all
the months of the lease, in an amount for the full monthly installment of $800.00, and
damages should be calculated for $10.00/day starting on the 10th of May for the
remainder of the term of the lease. [Exhibit 1 at 12, 19].
There is significant question as to when the term of the lease ended. The lower
court found that the Montgomery's "left Hardy a voicemail explaining they were moving
out" and that the Montgomery's only needed to pay for half of February because of this
phone call. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 378-379 at 123; 380-381 at 11; 384 at ,I2]. Hardy
asserts the language of the lease agreement is clear that the tenancy is ''terminable upon
fifteen (15) days written notice served by either party." [Exhibit 1 at ,1s TENANT'S
HOLD OVER]. As such Hardy asserts the earliest time the lease ended was after March
when Hardy retook possession of the premises. The lower court also agrees with this
conclusion stating "Paragraph 36 allows the Montgomerys to exercise the
option ... through the end of the lease period, April, 2014 ... " See, Findings of Fact, [R.
382 at ,I6]. This court should reverse the lower court's ruling which is inconsistent with
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its own ruling that the Montgomery's were not liable for rents in February or March,
despite the lower court also stating the term ran through April. Additional rents should
be calculated for all of these months as well.

II.

The lower court erred in ruling Hardy waived his right to additional rent by

~

applying outdated case law.

The lower court's finding that Hardy waived his right to collect additional rents is
inconsistent with the law in Utah. °The lower court cites Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P .2d 430,
432 (Utah 1983) as its authority, however, in 1993 in Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass 'n, the Supreme Court of Utah states, "we reject the attempt by Hunter and its

progeny, both in the court of appeals and here, to elaborate the facts necessary to show
intentional relinquishment beyond Phoenix's general statement." "We further clarify that

~

the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct." Soter 's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass 'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942. The Supreme Court continues, "With this legal requirement,

~

we ensured that waiver would not be found from any particular set of facts unless it was
clearly intended... Consistent with this point is the general principle in our case law that
"mere silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation to speak."" Id. at

940 citing Plateau Mining Co., 802 P.2d at 730, quoted in Rees, 808 P.2d at 1073.
(Emphasis added)

The court below in this case found contrary to the case law that

Hardy's mere silence to request the additional rent was a waiver of Hardy's right to
collect the additional rent. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 380 at 14]. Additionally the lower
court failed to recognize Hardy's claim that rent was never paid on time due to the
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deficiency of the additional rent. The Supreme Court of Utah in Soter, absolves Hardy's
silence as there is no "intentional relinquishment of a right" made "distinctly" on the part
of Hardy. Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942.
Furthermore, there is clearly no obligation on Hardy's part to demand the additional rent
as the parties agreed in the lease agreement that Hardy would not have any duty to
demand full payment from the Montgomery's. [Exhibit 1 at ,30]. For this additional
reason in which the lower court's conclusion is contrary to the law of waiver as
established by the Utah Supreme Court, Hardy requests that the lower court's ruling be
reversed and Hardy be awarded additional rent for the entire lease period of May 2013 March of 2014, or as the lower court found the lease to expire in April 2014 whichever
~

this court finds equitable. Additionally, Hardy asserts that if the Montgomery's failed to
pay the full amount of rent for the entire lease period, the lower court's finding that they
had paid rent on time for any month should be reversed and late fees for all months be
awarded and damages of $10.00/day be recalculated from the 10th of May 2013 going
forward to the time this court finds the lease agreement expired.
III.

The lower court's finding of waiver based on Hardy's attempt to settle the
dispute by offering the Montgomery's a chance to purchase the property
despite their default is horrible policy which encourages litigation.
The lower court's finding that Hardy waived his rights by using a letter from

Hardy's attorney in which Hardy tries to propose a settlement is horrible policy. See,
Findings of Fact, [R. 380 at 14]; [Exhibit 4]. Hardy did not object to the offer of
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settlement letter being introduced as evidence for the very reason that Hardy wanted to
show the court that Hardy had made reasonable efforts to provide the Montgomery's with

&;i

the chance to purchase the property even though they had defaulted on the majority of
their obligations. The court below rather than recognizing Hardy's attempt to allow the
Montgomery's to purchase the property, instead uses it to punish Hardy by claiming its
evidence of a waiver to additional rents. Id. Hardy's argument is simple; he relied on the
court not arbitrarily ignoring the plain language of paragraph 30 which preserves his right
to enforce the terms of the lease agreement including those he specifically didn't mention
in the letter offering to settle with the Montgomery's. [Exhibit 1 at 130]. The lower
court's ruling suggests Hardy was foolish to try and settle the matter, and even more
foolish to think the court would give effect to the non-waive clause of the lease
agreement.
LATE FEES AND DAMAGES WERE CALCULATED INCORRECTLY

Late fees and damages should be recalculated starting in May 2013 rather than in June of
2013 because Hardy did not waive his right to collect additional rent the Montgomery's
never paid.
I.

The Montgomery's never paid the full amount of rent and therefore never
paid rent on time.

As previously argued, Hardy contends that the non-waiver clause is in fact
enforceable allowing him to recover the $100.00 of additional rent provided for in the
lease agreement. [Exhibit 1 at 12, 19, 30] Since the Montgomery's never paid the full
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~·

$800.00 called for by the lease agreement, $700.00 rent and $100.00 additional rent,
~

Hardy argues that the Montgomery's cannot claim to have ever paid rent on time. Id.
Jeremy Montgomery's testimony [R. 415:1-25; 416:1-25] [transcript 15:1-25; 16:1-25];

t@

[Exhibit 2]; [Exhibit 3]. The lower court was therefore incorrect in determining that the
Montgomery's were only late for June and October's rent because the Montgomery's
failed to pay the entire amount of rent for any month of the agreement. Since the

(@

Montgomery's failed to pay the full amount of rent for May, the Montgomery's should be
responsible for late fees for every month of the lease agreement, May 2013 through
Qt

March 2013. Damages of$10.00/day should be calculated from May 10, 2013 through
March 2013 or for an amount of $3040.00 as outlined in Hardy's complaint. The lower
court's calculations for damages and late fees should be reversed and recalculated to
include all the months of the lease agreement since the Montgomery's failed to pay the
entire amount of rent owed to Hardy.
IL

The court below failed to calculate 10% based on the total monthly

installment.
The lower court's late fees were incorrectly calculated because the court relied on
only the rent value rather than the total monthly installment. The lease agreement states
in bold writing, "RENTS THAT ARE MORE THAN FIVE DAYS LATE ARE
SUBJECT TO A LATE FEE OF 10% OF THE TOTAL MONTHLY
INSTALLMENT." [Exhibit 1 at 12, 19] Given that ~e total monthly installment was

$800.00 and not $700.00, the court incorrectly arrived at a calculation of $70.00/month
for the months the court found the Montgomery's were late with rent. Hardy requests the
36
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lower court's ruling be reversed, late fees should be applied for all the months of the
lease, and all late fees reflect the total monthly installment of $800.00 or $80.00.
III.

Partial payments made by the Montgomery's were even paid late.

The lower court was still incorrect to find the Montgomery's paid rent on time
even though the court's calculation was not based on the full amount owed to Hardy.
The lease agreement states that rent is due "in advance on the 5th day of the month."
[Exhibit 1 at 12]. All the checks of the Montgomery's are dated after the 5th of the
month. [Exhibit 3]. The payments of the Montgomery's are all late. The question the
court below confuses is if the payments trigger the late fee and damages provision. The
lower court finds that even though the amount is only partial payment the Montgomery's
did not incur late fees and damages until June of 2013. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 380-381
at 11]. Hardy at the time of the lease period lived in New York. See, Findings of Fact, [R.
376 at ,I2] Jeremy Montgomery's testimony [R. 413:1-2; 436:23; 453:22] [transcript
13:1-2, 36:23; 453:22] The court's own rule, the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(c)
gives a minimum of three (3) days for mailed items with regards to service. Based on the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court incorrectly finds that May's check dated the 8th of
May arrived at Hardy's in New York prior to the 10th of May. [Exhibit 3]. Applying the
lower court's Rule 6(c) for purposes of mailing things, Hardy would receive the check
after the 10th of May. The lower court erred in calculating damages accruing only in
June. This is yet another reason why the lower court's decision should be reversed and
late fees and damages be recalculated to include late fees for all months and damages for
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no less than $3040.00 or calculated by the time the lower court states the lease agreement
G,

ended which was April of 2014. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 382 at if6].
The lower court does not explain why late fees are triggered for June and October
when the lower court also finds that no late fees were incurred for November through
March, the months the Montgomery's did not pay any rent at all. Id. 377 at ,r12, 13, 14;
378 at if22; 380-381 at ifl; 384 at ,r2. The lower court's ruling is inconsistent in that the
lower court rules the Montgomery's were excused from paying rent after receiving a
letter from Hardy's attorney which is dated in September, and yet the court finds the
Montgomery's were late with their rental obligation for October. Id. The Montgomery's
paying rent in October, even though it was late, shows the Montgomery's clear
understanding that they were subject to pay rent in addition to the option payment and
could not arbitrarily decide to apply the option to rent, even after receiving Hardy's letter.
The lower court's inconsistencies with its own conclusion beg for this decision to be
reversed as it is impossible to make any sense as to how the lower court determines when
an obligation is excused or not excused by the parties.
HARDY IS ENTITLED TO COLLECT EXPENSES AND HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES
The lower court ruled that neither party was entitled to collect attorney's fees. The
lease agreement states, "Should it become necessary for the Landlord to employ an

01

attorney to enforce any of the conditions or covenants hereof, including the collection of
rentals or gaining possession of the Premises, Tenant agrees to pay all expenses so

incurred, including a reasonable attorneys'fee." (emphasis added) [Exhibit! at 123].
Since Hardy was forced to hire an attorney to enforce the late fees and damages clause of
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the lease agreement, Hardy is entitled to have the Montgomery's pay his expenses and a
reasonable attorney's fee. The lower court argued that for purposes of the REPC the
terms of the lease agreement are part of an integrated contract, then the only just
conclusion makes it necessary for the lower court not to selectively apply some of the
terms but rather to apply all the terms of the lease agreement including this provision that
the parties intended the Montgomery's pay Hardy's expenses and attorney's fees for
having to enforce the conditions of the lease agreement including late fees and damages

~

which the lower court found Hardy was entitled to recover. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 384
at ,I2].

~

While the lower court justifies its non-enforcement of the attorney's fees based on
the idea of reciprocity (both parties prevailing on claims therefore it is appropriate both
parties pay their own attorney's fee), this is a false conclusion because it is based on the
false premise that the Montgomery's were entitled to a refund of the "non-refundable
option payment of $7,000.00." [Exhibit I at ,I36]. As argued above, the lower court's
conclusion to refund the $7,000.00 is contrary to the clear language of the contract stating
the option payment is non-refundable. Id. Again, the lower court in its conclusions states
Hardy's performance is suspended due to the Montgomery's default, but then incorrectly
rules that Hardy still had an obligation to perform the option.
"It could be argued that t;he option terminated upon the Montgomerys' default.
But a default only suspends the non-defaulting party's performance until it is
discharged when the default amounts to a total breach ... Although the right to
exercise the option was suspended by their breach, the Montgomery's had the
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right to cure the default, exercise the option and purchase the house pursuant to the
REPC." See, Findings of Fact, [R. 382-383 at if6].
In other words, Hardy was suspended from performing his part of the
option agreement, but Hardy anticipatorily repudiated when Hardy correctly asserted his
rights under the lease agreement that the Montgomery's had defaulted on their
obligations. The lower court inappropriately shifts the blame to Hardy for the
Montgomery's defaults (plural), as such the court is wrong to refund the Montgomery's
the "non-refundable option payment of$7,000.00." [Exhibit 1 at if36]. Since the
Montgomery's are not entitled to a refund of the "non-refundable option payment of
$7,000.00," the Montgomery's claim against Hardy fails which means only Hardy's
claims against the Montgomery's stand. Id. Since only Hardy's claims are justified, with
the Montgomery's claims being dismissed, reciprocity of attorney's fees does not apply
and Hardy should be entitled to collect his expenses and a reasonable attorney's fee.
Hardy's attorney fees should include fees Hardy incurred as a result of having to
bring this matter before the court of appeals.
The parties agreed in the lease agreement that Hardy was entitled to expenses and
a reasonable attorneys' fee ifhe were required to enforce any of the conditions. [Exhibit 1
at if23] It was necessary for Hardy to employ an attorney to enforce many of the
conditions of the lease agreement. The language of the attorneys' fees provision is clear
that the Montgomery's pay all expenses and attorneys' fee as a result of having to enforce
the provisions of the lease agreement. Id Since the both parties assumed the risk that the
lower court could error in its findings and conclusion, they both had adequate notice that
40
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both parties could incur additional expenses and fees to correct the lower court's findings.
Ironically it was necessary for Hardy to employ his attorney to see that the "attorneys'
fees" provision, as well as other provisions of the lease agreement, be enforced by filing
an appeal. Hardy should be entitled to collect all of his expenses, including a reasonable
attorney's fee for the entire matter, including expenses and attorney's fee incurred for this
appeal.
Hardy's attorney fees should also include Hardy's attorney's fees incurred for time

~

spent correcting/remedying actions taken by the lower court due to the court's prejudice
and/or negligence. The record shows one in which the lower court continually acted in a
prejudicial manner which required Hardy to file additional motions to protect his rights
the court refused to acknowledge.
Hardy's right to notice of hearings; [R. 161-181; 327, 344-355]
Hardy's right to attend hearings; Id.
Hardy's right to bring this matter before the court without it being dismissed
prematurely under a rule that did not apply; [R.146-155, especially 149]
Hardy's right to not have his former attorney (Mark Morley) who drafted the lease
agreement which was the subject matter of the proceeding testify as a witness called by
the Montgomery's. See, Findings of Fact, [R. 376 at 15; 380 at 14] Defendant's Initial
Disclosures [R. 35-36]; Motion in Limine to Exclude Morley's testimony [185217];Memorandum Decision and Order (ordering an in camera hearing, read off the
record)[R. 303-310];Notice of Withdrawal of Motion in Limine (so as to require
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Morley's testimony to be on the record and preserve Hardy's claims, civil and
professionally against Morley) [R. 311-312].
While the court repeatedly failed to inform Hardy of hearings and trying to
dismiss the matter prematurely are not foreseeable, it is not equitable for Hardy to bear
the costs and legal fees associated with trying to remedy these derelictions of the court
when the Montgomery's agreed to pay fees if they necessitated Hardy bringing the matter
(i!J

to court. The fact the Montgomery's tried to call Hardy's former attorney as a witness is
an obvious attempt by the Montgomery's to make the litigation more expensive for
Hardy by forcing him to file a motion in limine. This blatant attempt by the
Montgomery's to increase the cost of litigation for Hardy was successful, and the
Montgomery's should bear full responsibility for all costs and attorney's fees associated
with Hardy having to try to protect a fundamental right that his communication with
legal counsel be protected. Hardy asks this Court to reverse the lower court's ruling by
enforcing the provision of the lease agreement which clearly states Hardy is entitled to a
reasonable attorney's fees. Hardy further requests that this court rule that a reasonable
attorney's fee should include attorney's fees for the additional time spent on this matter
that was no fault of Hardy's.

CONCLUSION
Hardy respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the lower court
by enforcing the terms of the lease agreement, holding the option payment as stated in the
lease agreement cannot be refunded to the Montgomery's, hold the Montgomery's
responsible for paying Hardy rents for all the months of the lease agreement May 2013
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through March 2014, hold the Montgomery's responsible for paying Hardy the additional
rent called for in the lease agreement of $100.00 for the entire period of the lease,
recalculate late fees for all the months the Montgomery's failed to pay the full amount ~f
rent on time, recalculate late fees to reflect 10% of the full rental installment, recalculate
damages to reflect the Montgomery's failure to pay the full amount of rent installment
from the beginning of the agreement, grant Hardy his expenses and attorney's fees for
having to bring this case before the lower court and this Court.

DATED this 24th day of August, 2016.

,,,,.--

"

7s/ Tyler Woodworth
Tyler A. Woodworth, Esq.
Attorney for the Appellant
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ADDENDUM
FINDINGS OF FACT/CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT [R.375-387]

EXHIBITl-LEASEAGREEMENT

EXHIBIT 2 COPY OF JUNE'S RENT CHECK
EXHIBIT 3 COPIES OF CHECKS
EXHIBIT 4 LETTER TO MONTGOl\ffiRY'S

41

46

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: February 05, 2016
Isl Geor
03:38:02 PM
Distri

SHANE CLIFFORD (#10063)
CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES
P.O. Box580
Price, UT 84501
Telephone: (435) 613-1010
E-mail: shanec@shanec Ii fford law .com

Attorney for Defendants Jeremy Montgomery and Julie Montgomery
(iJJ

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD HARDY,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
Ci)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

vs.
Civil No.: 140700039
JEREMY MONTGOMERY and JULIE

Judge: George M. Harmond

MONTGOMERY,

Defendants.

JEREMY MONTGOMERY and JULIE
MONTGOMERY,

Counterclaimants,

v.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

February 05, 2016 03:38 PM

0375
1 of 11

~

RICHARD HARDY,

Counterdefendant.

<iv
This matter crune on regularly for trial before the court sitting at Price, Utah without a

jwy on October 2, 2015. Plaintiff Richard Hardy, (hereinafter "Hardy") was personally present
and represented by counsel, Tyler Woodworth; Defendants Jeremy Montgomery and Julie
Montgomery (hereinafter "the Montgomerys") were both per~onally present and represented by
D. Shane Clifford. The court, having heard testimony and received other evidence, and having
heard argument of counsel, hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

I. Hardy owns a home and real property located at 2044 West 4300 North, Helper, Carbon
County Utah.
2. In late 2012 or early 2013, Hardy and his wife, in preparation for moving to New York state
listed the home for sale with Bridge Realty, a real estate brokerage.
3. Before the house sold, Hardy met the Montgomerys through church.
4. Montgomerys were interested in buying Hardy's home, but Hardy did not want to pay the real
estate commission, so the parties agreed that the Montgomerys would lease the home with an
option to purchase the house after the listing agreement had expired.

5. Mark Morley, an attorney acquainted with both parties, prepared the "Lease Agreement"(the
"Lease") which contained.an option to purchase the house at an agreed upon price.
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6. Attached to the Lease, and incorporated therein by paragraph 36, was a real estate purchase
contract ("REPC") dated April 16, 2013-the same date as the lease-for the purchase of the
house and property. The REPC provided that Hardy would finance the sale of the home for 60
months.
7. The parties signed the lease on April I 7, 2013, striking out paragraph l 7 regarding pets, but
Hardy refused to sign the REPC on that date because he had an "uneasy feeling" about the sale
of the home to the Montgomerys.
8. Nevertheless, Hardy accepted the Montgomerys payment of$7,000.00 on that date as
consideration for the option to purchase contained in the lease.
9. The option provided that the Montgomerys could exercise the option and purchase the house
at ~y time after September 15, 2013-presumably, the date Hardy's listing agreement with
Bridge Realty expired.
IO.In a July 2013 phone conversation between Jeremy Montgomery and Hardy, Hardy indicated
that he no longer wanted to sell the house to Montgomerys.
11.The Montgomerys paid $700.00 a month in rent beginning May 2013 through October 2013.
12.On September 20, 2013, Hardy's lawyer sent a letter to the Montgomerys informing them that
Hardy did not intend to finance the purchase of the house; and that the Montgomerys would
be required to find financing through another source.
13.The letter also informed the Montgomerys that they were in breach of the Lease because their
payments for May and June were late and that they also owed late fees and liquidated
damages.
14.The Montgomerys stopped paying rent in October 2013 and vacated the house by the second
week in February 2014.
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15 .Hardy claims that the Montgomerys took items of personal property from the house: a
refrigerator, a cabinet with sleeping bags, a queen or king sized bed, a chain saw, some
clamps, and that they changed the locks.
16.Hardy also claims that he lost potential sales of the house during the time it was occupied by
the Montgomerys, but beyond expressing his belief, he did not present any evidence of such
(i;

lost.sales.
17.The Montgomerys testified that they left the house in good, clean condition and that they did
not take a refrigerator.
18.They explained that an old freezer left there by Hardy stopped working, so they replaced it
with a new freezer, which they took when they left.
19.The Montgomerys also testified that there was no cabinet with sleeping bags in the house, no
queen or king sized bed, no chain saw or clamps, and that the locks were changed by
agreement with Hardy.
~

20.Hardy further claimed at trial that he is entitled to an extra $100.00 in rent for each month
pursuant to paragraph 19 of the Lease, which requires the extra payment for insurance on the
property.
21.The Montgomerys testified that Hardy informed them they would not be required topay the
extra for insurance until they purchased the house, but after the purchase they would be
required to keep the house insured.
22.The Montgomerys further testified that when they received the letter from Hardy's lawyer that
they decided not to purchase the house, and used the $7000.00 that they had paid for the
option as a credit to cover rent for November, December, January and two weeks in February.

~

23.The Montgomerys attempted to call Hardy in January to tell him they were moving out, but
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could not reach him, and instead left Hardy a voicemail explaining that they were moving out.
24.On May 15. 2014, Hardy filed this action.
25.The Montgomerys filed counterclaims.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. "An anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an executory contract manifests a positive and
unequivocal intent not to render performance when the time fixed for performance is due. The
other party can immediately treat the anticipatory repudiation as a breach, or it can continue to
treat the contract as operable and urge performance without waiving any right to sue for that
repudiation." 1
2. Hardy's claims are as follows: 1) The Montgomerys violated the terms of the Lease, and the
REPC and addendum thereto should be ignored; 2) the Montgomerys owe rent in the amount
of$800.00 per month, not $700.00, because they agreed to pay an additional $I 00.00 per
month for insurance under paragraph 19 of the Lease; 3) the Montgomerys owe late fees in the
amount of $700.00 and "liquidated damages" in the amount of $3,040.00; 4) the Montgomerys
owe damages for opportunities Hardy had to forego because he could not sell the house from
May 2013 through March 2014; 5) the Montgomerys owe damages for Hardy's missing
personal property.
0!P

3. First, Hardy urges the court to ignore the REPC and to only consider the Lease, claiming that
the parties agreed the REPC was not binding. The court did not hear testimony or receive
other evidence of any such agreement. The text of the Lease, and the evidence at trial do not
support the claim the REPC should be ignored. Hardy wanted to sell the house to the
Montgomerys, but did not want to pay a real estate commission to Bridge Realty. Paragraph

~
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36 of the Lease clearly integrates the REPC and seller financing addendum into the Lease and
the REPC is dated the same date as the Lease. The court cannot arbitrarily ignore the plain
language of Paragraph 36, and concludes the REPC and addendum are part of the Lease.
4. Second, Hardy claims the Montgomerys owe him $800.00 per month in rent, rather than
$700.00, because of the requirements of paragraph 19 of the Lease.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P .2d
430,432 (Utah 1983) (quoting American Savings & LoanAss'n v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d
289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968)). To waive a right, there must be an existing right, benefit
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. Id. The party's
actions or conduct must evince unequivocally an intent to waive, or must be inconsistent
with any other intent. 2

~

Paragraph 19 calls for Montgomerys to make an additional payment of$100.00 per month
to cover insurance on the home. Hardy's attorney drafted the Lease and Hardy therefore is
charged with knowledge of the contents of the Lease, including paragraph 19. The
Montgomerys made each rental payment, all in the amount of$700.00, directly to Hardy.
Hardy never told the Montgomerys that the rental payment was in the wrong amount.
Most telling, in the September 20, 2013 letter from Hardy's attorney, there is no demand
for the additional $100.00 per month, even though the letter details other amounts owing
and references several provisions of the Lease. From these facts, the court concludes that
Hardy intentionally waived the right to collect the additional $100.00 each month in rent.
I. Third, Hardy claims that the Montgomerys owe $3,040.00 in late fees and liquidated damages.
Hardy could not recall when he received the rent checks, although he testified that they were
all late. The checks themselves reveal that only the June and October payments were late. The
June payment was dated June 19, 2015, and the October payment was dated October 22, 2013.
2
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The other checks were not over 5 days late and therefore not subject to the late fee. The court
finds that the Montgomerys owe $140.00 in late fees for the two late payments. Payments over
~

5 days late also triggered liquidated damages of$10.00 per day. The June payment, being over
5 days late began accruing liquidated damages. As the Montgomerys did not ever pay the late
4/j)

fees, the liquidated damages continued to accrue until the Montgomerys left the property on
February 8, 2014 (the second weekend in February.) This is 242 days at $10.00 per day or
$2,420.00.
2. Fourth, Hardy testified that he "thought" he lost potential sales of the house, which was his
justification for keeping the $7,000.00 option payment. Hardy did not point to a specific buyer
or buyers he may have had for the house. Of course, the house was off the market for the
period of time that the Montgomerys occupied the house, but without any evidence of a
potential sale, Hardy is merely speculating that he may have been able to sell the house and,
,,

indeed, prevented the sale of the home to the Montgomerys through his repudiation.
Accordingly, the court cannot find that Hardy suffered damages for lost sales.
3. Fifth, Hardy claims the Montgomerys kept or lost certain items of personal property he left in
~

the house. He did not offer any evidence of the value of these items. The Montgomerys
testified the items were not in the house. The burden is on Hardy to prove this claim, and the
court finds he has not met this burden and the court therefore cannot award any damages on
these items.
4. The Montgomerys claim that 1) the REPC was integrated into the Lease and cannot be
ignored; 2) Hardy anticipatorily repudiated the option under paragraph 36 of the Lease; 3)
because of that anticipatory repudiation, Hardy was unjustly enriched, and the amount of that
unjust enrichment should be offset against anything the Montgomerys owe Hardy; 4) there is

~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
February 05, 2016 03:38 PM
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0381
7 of 11

~

~

no evidence of any lost sales opportunity for the house; 5) Hardy has not quantified any of the
damages he claims.
5. First, the court has concluded in a previous analysis that the REPC and addendum were
integrated into and part of the Lease.
6. Second, Hardy testified be decided not to sign the REPC at the time the Lease was signed,

because he had an "uneasy feeling." Though not amounting to an anticipatory repudiation at
that point, it clearly indicated Hardy was having second thoughts about financing the property.

In the July 2013 phone call with Jeremy, Hardy confirmed he would not sell the property to
Montgomerys. Finally. the September 20, 2013 letter from Hardy's lawyer confirms he would
not finance the sale of the property to Montgomerys. Hardy's decision to not sign the REPC,
informing Jeremy he would not sell them the house and the letter from his lawyer in

~

September, 2013 all amount to an anticipatory repudiation, especially in light of the
Montgomerys' $7,000.00 option payment made at the Lease signing, which granted them the
option to purchase the property through the end of the lease term in December, 2013. The
court finds that the anticipatory repudiation took place in July 2013, when Hardy's refusal to
perform according to the terms of the option became "positive and unequivocal." 3

Both at the time of the telephone call in July, 2013, and the September 20, 2013 letter, the
Montgomerys were not current with all financial obligations, not having paid the late fees
set out in the Lease, nor the "liquidated damages" charge required by the Lease. Paragraph
36 allows the Montomerys to exercise the option to purchase pursuant to the REPC at any
time from September 15, 2013 through the end of the lease period, April, 2014, if they
were not in default. It could be argued that the option terminated upon the Montgomerys'
3
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default. But a default only suspends the non-defaulting party's performance until it is
discharged when the default amounts to a total breach. 4 Though the Lease at paragraph 20
defines a default, the Lease is silent as to the right to cure the default but also does not
preclude it. Although the right to exercise the option was suspended by their breach, the
Montgomerys had the right to cure the default, exercise the option and purchase the house
pursuant to the REPC. Hardy's anticipatory repudiation breached the option agreement.

The remedy for a seller's anticipatory breach of an option to purchase real estate is "the
difference between the market price and the contract price at the time of the breach. "5 The
Montgomerys have not introduced evidence of the property's value and therefore the court
cannot award damages for anticipatory breach.
1. Third, the Montgomerys claim that Hardy was unjustly enriched because of his acceptance of
the $7,000.00 option payment, and his repudiation of the option.
In order to prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, three elements must be met. First,
there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another. Second, the conferee must
appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. Finally, there must be "the acceptance or
retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable
for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value."6

In this case, the Montgomerys paid $7,000.00 to Hardy for the right to exercise an option
within a certain period of time, from September 15, 2013 to December 31, 2013. Hardy
received the benefit of the $7,000.00. Second, Hardy acknowledged receipt of the
$7,000.00 and deposited it into his personal account, so he clearly had knowledge of the
benefit. Finally, after his anticipatory repudiation in July, prior to the running of the option

4

5
6
~
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period, Hardy retained the full $7,000.00. It would be inequitable for Hardy to keep the
full amount, having foreclosed the Montgomerys exercise of the option by his repudiation.
~

Therefore, the court finds that Hardy was unjustly enriched for the full $7,000.00. The
Montgomerys were damaged by the repudiation in the amount of$7,000.00.
1. Fourth and fifth, the court previously dealt with Hardy's claim for lost sales opportunities and
his claim for personal property in the preceding paragraphs, and will not reiterate the analyses
here.
2. In summary, Hardy is entitled to payment from the Montgomerys in the amount of$140.00 in
late fees and $2,420.00 in liquidated damages. The Montgomerys are entitled to payment from
Hardy in the amount of$1,990.00, calculated as follows. The Montgomerys paid a total of
$4,200.00 in rent, but owed $6,550.00 ($700.00 per month for May 2013 through January
2014, and $350.00 for half of February, 2014.) This leaves a balance owing of$2,350.00. The
Montgomerys are entitled to damages in the amount of$7,000.00, which the court will apply
to the rent and other amounts owing from Montgomerys to Hardy, or $7,000.00 less $2,350.00
rent, $140.00 late fees and $2,420.00 in liquidated damages, leaving $1,990.00 owing from
Hardy to the Montgomerys.
3. The Montgomerys are granted judgment in the amount of$1,990.00, together with their costs.
4. The court will not grant attorney fees to either party, as each party prevailed only on
certain aspects of their claims.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of January, 2016, I served a copy of the foregoing proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law via U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, and via e-mail,
addressed as follows:
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Tyler A. Woodworth (#13598)
TYLER A. WOODWORTH, P.C.
1436 S. Legend Hills Dr., Suite 325
Clearfield, UT 84015
tvler<@taw-Iaw.com
By: Isl Shane Clifford
Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1992)(intemal citations omitted).
Barnes v. Wood, 150 P.2D 1226, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1992)("An anticipatory breach occurs when a party to the executory
contract manifests a positive and unequivocal intent not to render performance when the time fixed for performance is
due.")
Rest. Contracts 2d § 242 cmt. A ("Ordinarily there is some period of time between suspension and discharge, and during
this period a party may cure his failure.")
Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66 (1982).
Desert Miriah, Inc., v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ~ 13, 12 P.3d 580, 582 holding modified by State v. Levin, 2006
Utah 50, ~ 13, 144 P.3d 1096 (internal citations omitted).
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: February 05, 2016
Isl Georg
03:38:20 PM
Distric

SHANE CLIFFORD (#10063)
CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES
P.O. Box 580
Price, UT 84501
Telephone: (435) 613-1010
E-mail: shanec@shanecl ifford law .corn

Attorney for Defendants Jeremy Montgomery and Julie Montgomery
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD HARDY,
JUDGMENT
~

Plaintiff,

Civil No.: 140700039

vs.

Judge: George M. Harmond
JEREMY MONTGOIVIERY and JULIE
MONTGOMERY,
~

Defendants.
JEREMY MONTGO1\.1ERY and JULIE
MONTGOMERY,

Counterclaimants,

v.
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RICHARD HARDY,
~

Counterdefendant.

The Court, having entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being otherwise
fully advised, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
Jeremy Montgomery and Julie Montgomery shall have judgment against Richard Hardy in the
principal amount of $1,990.00.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of January, 2016, I served a copy of the foregoing proposed
Judgment via U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, and via e-mail, addressed as follows:
Tyler A. Woodworth (#13598)
TYLER A. WOODWORTH, P.C.
1436 S. Legend Hills Dr., Suite 325
Clearfield, UT 84015
tyler@taw-law.com

By: Isl Shane Clifford
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7TH DISTRICT COURT PRICE
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF OTAR
EXHIBIT LIST

RICHARD HARDY
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JEREMY MONTGOMERY
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Case.No:
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Date:

140700039

GEORGE M HARMOND
November 13, 2015

DAVIDS CLIFFORD Attorney for the Counterclaima
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LEASE AGREEMENT
THIS LEASE AGREEMENT (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement") made and entered into this 16th day of April,
203, by and between Richard Hardy (hereinafter referred to as 11 Landlord11) and Jeremy & Julie Montgomery hereinafter referred to as
"Tenant'').
.__ .. . ~- --··

WITNESSETH:

Gj

WHEREAS, Landlord owns certain real property being, lying and situated in Carbon County, Utah, such real property
having a street address of2044 W 4300 N, Helper, Utah 84526 (hereinafter referred to as the "Premises") and has authority to enter
this Lease; and,
WHEREAS, Landlord desires to lease the Premises to Tenant upon the tenns and conditions as contained herein; and
WHEREAS, Tenant desires to lease the Premises from Landlord on the terms and conditions as contained herein;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the covenants and obligations contained herein and other good and
valuable ~nsideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto hereby agree as follows:
1.
TERM. Landlord leases to Tenant and Tenant leases from Landlord the above descn"bed Premises on a Six Month Basis,
beginning on May 5, 2013and ending December 31, 2013, unless extended or earlier terminated as provided herein.
2.
RENT. The Rent for the tenn is equal to $700.00 per month, for each and every month in advance on the ~~ day of the
month. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Tenant shall pay any additional rent, which may be applicable, pursuant to Paragraphs
17, and 19. All such payments shall be made to Landlord at Landlord's address as set forth herein on or before the due date and
without demand. RENTS THAT ARE MORE THAN FIVE DAVS LATE ARE SUBJECT TO A LATE FEE OF 10% OF THE
TOTAL MONTHLY INSfALLMENT. If the rental installment is paid after the 10th, Tenant agrees to pay an additional $10.00 per
day as liquidated damages from the 10th until all rent, penalties, cleaning and/or damage charges, utility bills, fines and late fees are
paid in full. If the rental installment is not paid by the 15th, an eviction notice may be issued unless other arrangements have been
made. Tenant agrees to pay a S 20.00 charge for any returned check. If a Tenant bas two checks returned for insufficient funds, the
Tenant will be placed on a cash only basis.
All Rent due hereunder shall be paid to the following:

IT IS EXPRESSLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS BETWEEN THE LANDLORD AND EACH SIGNATORY OR
GUARANTOR INDJVIDUALLY AND SEVERALLY. IN TI-IE EVENT OF DEFAULT BY ANY ONE SIGNATORY OR
GUARANTOR, EACH AND EVERY REMAINING SIGNATORY OR GUARANTOR SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
TIMELY PAYMENT OF ALL AMOUNTS DUE HEREUNDER AND ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT.
3.
DAMAGE DEPOSIT. Upon the due execution of this Agreemen~ Tenant shall deposit with Landlord the sum ofN/A as
security for any damage caused to the Premises during the term hereof. Such deposit shall be returned to Tenant, without interest, and
less any applicable offset, within 30 days of the termination of this Agreement, provided that (1) the full tenn of the Agreement has
been completed; (2) no damage to the Premises, buildings or grounds has occurred; (3) the entire dwelling, appliances, closets, and
cupboards are clean and free from insects, dirt, dust, grease, etc.; (4) all windows have been cleaned inside and outside, all debris and
rubbish has been removed from the property and carpets have been commercially cleaned and left clean and odorless; (5) all unpaid
charges have been paid including late charg~ pet charges, smoking charges, delinquent lease payments, etc.; (6) all keys have been
returned.

4.
USE OF PREMISES. Tenant shall not use the Premises for any illegal or immoral purpose. The-Premises may be used and
occupied by Tenant and Tenant's immediate family, consisting of two adults and two children. Tenant shall comply with any and all
laws, ordinances, rules and orders of any and all governmental or quasi-governmental authorities affecting the cleanliness, use,,
occupancy and preservation of the Premises.

~

5.
CONDITION OF PREMISES; ESTOPPEL. Tenant stipulates, represents and warrants that Tenant has examined the
Premises, and that they are at th~ time of this Lease in good order, repair, and in a ~ clean and tenantable condition. Fwthennore,
Tenant represents and warrants that Tenant has made its own examination of the Premises and is not relying on any statement of the
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Landlord. Tenant accepts the Premises "AS IS> WHERE IS, WITH ALL FAULTS." Furthermore, upon Tenant's payment of each
monthly installment of Rent, Tenant acknowledges, represents and &z:,arees that Landlord is not in breach of this Agreement, in any
way, unless Tenant notifies Landlord, in writing at the time ofpaymen~ of such alleged default. No alleged defiw.lt hereunder shall
entitle Tenant to offset any amounts due hereunder or shall entitle Tenant to withhold rent
6.
ASSIGNMENT AND SUB-LETTING. Landlord may freely assign this Agreement Tenant shall not assign this
Agreement, or sub-let or grant any license to use the Premises or any part thereof without the prior written consent of Landlord. Any
consent by Landlord to one such assignment, sub-letting or license shall not be deemed to be consent to any subsequent assignment,
sub-letting or license. An assignment, sub-letting or license without the prior written consent of Landlord or an assignment or subletting by operation of law shall be absolutely nuU and void and shall, at Landlord1s option. tenninate this Agreement

~

7.
ALTERATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS. Tenant shall make no alterations to the buildings or improvements on the
Premises or construct any building or make any other improvements on the Premises without the prior written consent of Landlord.
Any and all alterations, changes, and/or improvements buil~ constructed or placed on the Premises by Tenant shall, unless otherwise
provided by written agreement between Landlord and Tenant, be and become the property of Landlord and remain on the Premises at
the expiration or earlier termination of this Agreement
8.
NON-DELIVERY OF POSSESSION. In the event Landlord cannot deliver possession of the Premises to Tenant upon the
commencement of the Lease tenn, through no fiwlt of Landlord or its agents, then Landlord or its agents shall have no liability, but the
rental herein provided shall abate until possession is given. Landlord or its agents shall have thirty (30) days in which to give
possession, and if possession is tendered within such time, Tenant agrees to accept the demised Premises and pay the rental herein
provided from that date. In the event possession cannot be delivered within such time, through no fault of Landlord or its agents, then
this Agreement and all rights hereunder shall tenninate.

9.
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS. Tenant shall not keep on the Premises any item of a dangerous, flammable or explosive
character that might unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion on the Premises or that might be considered h82Mdous or
extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company.
I0.
UTILITIES. Tenant shall be responsible for arranging for and paying for all utility services required on the Premises.
FAILURE OF TENANT TO PAY FOR UTILITY SERVICES REQUJRED ON THE PREMISES SHALL BE A MATERIAL
BREACH OF TENANT'S OBLIGATIONS HEREUNDER.
11.
REPAIR; RULES. Tenant shall have the exclusive otiligation, at its sole expense, to keep and maintain the Premises,
including but not limited to the fixtures, mechanical, electrical, plumbing, landscaping, and finishes, together with the appurtenances
in good and sanitary condition and repair during the tenn of this Agreement and any renewal thereof. Without limiting the generality
of the foregoin& Tenant shall:
(a)

Not obstruct the driveways, sidewalks, courts, entry ways, stairs and/or halls. which shall be used for the pwposes ofingress and
egress only;
(b) Keep all windows, glass, window coverings, doors, locks and hardware in good, clean order and repair;
(c)

Not obstruct or cover the windows or doors;

{d) Not leave windows or doors in an open position during any inclement weather;
{e) Not hang any laundry, clothing, sheets, etc. from any window, rail, porch or balcony nor air or dry any of same within any yard

area or space;
(t) Not cause or permit any locks or hooks to be placed upon any door or window without the prior written consent of Landlord;
{g) Keep all air conditioning filters clean and free from dirt;

(h) Keep all lavatories, sinks, toilets, and all other water and plumbing apparatus in good order and repair and shall use same only
for the pmposes for which they were constructed. Tenant shall not allow any sweepings, rubbish, sand, rags, ashes or other substances
to be thrown or deposited therein. Any damage to any such apparatus and the cost of clearing stopped plumbing resulting from misuse
shall be borne by Tenant;
(i) And Tenant's family and guests shall at all times maintain order in the Premises and at all places on the Premises, and shall not
make or permit any loud or improper noises, or otherwise disturb other residents;
(j) Keep all radios, television sets, stereos, phonographs, etc., turned down to a level of sound that does not annoy or interfere with
other residents;
(k) Deposit all trash, garbage, rubbish or refuse in the locations provided therefore and shall not allow any trash, garbage, rubbish or
refuse to be deposited or permitted to stand on the exterior of any building or within the common elements;
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(I) Abide by and be bound by any and all rules and regulations affecting the Premises or the ~ommon
which may be adopted or promulgated by the Landlord, from time to time.

~..J\. :··::

a,re; app~rtenant thereto

The rules stated above are a material tenn to this Agreement Any violation of the above stated rules ·shall be deemed a default of
Tenant hereunder.
12.
DAMAGE TO PREMISES. In the event the Premises are destroyed or rendered wholly uninhabitable by fire, storm.
earthquake, or other casualty not caused by the negligence of Tenant, this Agreement shall tenninate from such time except for the
purpose of enforcing rights that may have then accrued hereunder. The rental provided for herein shall then be accounted for by and
between Landlord and Tenant up to the time of such injury or destruction of the Premises, Tenant paying rentals up to such date and
Landlord refunding rentals collected beyond such date. Should a portion of the Premises thereby be rendered uninhabitable, the
Landlord shall have the option of either repairing such injured or damaged portion or tenninating this Lease. In the event that
Landlord exercises its right to repair such uninhabitable portion, the rental shall abate in the proportion that the injured parts bears to
the whole Premises, and such part so injured shall be restored by Landlord as speedily as practicable, after which the full rent shall
recommence and the Agreement continue according to its tenns.
13.
INSPECTION OF PREMISES. Landlord and Landlord's agents shall have the right at all reasonable times during the term
of this Agreement and any renewal thereof to enter the Premises for the purpose of inspecting the Premises and all buildings and
improvements thereon and for the purposes of making any repairs, additions or alterations as may be deemed appropriate by Landlord
for the preservation of the Premises or the building. Landlord and its agents shall further have the right to exhibit the Premises and to
display the usual for sale", "for rent'' or "vacancy" signs on the Premises at any time. The right of entry shall likewise exist for the
purpose of removing placards, signs, fixtures, alterations or additions, that do not conform to this Agreement or to any restrictions,
rules or regulations affecting the Premises and for showing the Premises to prospective Tenants.
11

14.
SUBORDINATION OF LEASE. This Agreement and Tenant's interest hereunder are and shall be subordinate, junior and
inferior to any and all mortgages, liens or encumbrances now or hereafter placed on the Premises by Landlo~ all advances made
under any such mortgag~ liens or encumbrances (including. but not limited to, future advances}, the interest payab]e on such
mortgages, liens or encumbrances and any and all renewals, extensions or modifications of such mortgages, liens or encumbrances.
I5.
TENANT'S HOLD OVER. If Tenant remains in possession of the Premises with the consent of Landlord after the natural
expiration of this Agreement, a new tenancy from month-to-month shall be created between Landlord and Tenant which shall be
subject to all of the tenns and conditions hereof except that such tenancy shall be tenninable upon fifteen (15) days written notice
served by either party.

Qu

16.
SURRENDER OF PREMISES. Upon the expiration of the tenn hereof, Tenant shall surrender the Premises in as good a
state and condition as they were at the commencement of this Agreement, reasonable use and wear and tear thereof and damages by
the elements excepted. Tenant stipulates that the condition of the Premises is in a good, clean, and sanitary condition.

\Mo
~

.. ;,
.

.Ji
0\

ANIMALS; SMOKING. No pets shall be brought on the premises without prior written consent of the Landlord. In the
event Lan
·ves written consent, Tenant assumes all liability and agrees to be responsible for any damage or injuries rel • g to
any animals on e
ises. If the Tenant violates this provision of the agreement, the Tenant agrees (1) to pay the
rd
liquidated damages of S3 •
•ch both parties stipulate as a reasonable estimation of damages); (2) that the
eing paid shall
be increased and additional $150.00 per
for the remainder of the agreement; and (3) to be respons1
or the cost. both labor
and materials, of replacing ALL carpeting and p
remises upon the Landlord's request
·
Tenant or Tenant's guests or
invitees shall be allowed to smoke in the dwelling or on the p • s. Tenant wil
•
1 failing to comply with this rule. Smoke
gets into the carpeting, paint, and aJso disturbs the other T
or Tenant's guests or invitees violate this provision of
the agreement. the Tenant agrees tu.w-t!nw-me
dlord a fine of S 300.00 ; (2) tlie
eing paid shaJI immediately be increased an
additional S 150.00 per
for the remainder of the agreement; and (3) you as the Tenant •
barged and hereby accept
responsibili
y costs, both labor and materials, which result due to smoking on the premises includmg
• not limited to, the
p~· · 0 of ALL walls and ceilings, the replacement of ALL carpeting and pad in the entire dwelling, and the replaceme
6umed items, including but not limited to flooring, vinyl, fixtures or counter tops.
18.
QUIET ENJOYMENT. Tenant, upon payment of all of the sums referred to herein as being payable by Tenant and
Tenant's perfonnance of all Tenant's agreements contained herein and Tenant's observance of all rules and regulations, shall and may
peacefully and quietly have, hold and enjoy said Premises for the tenn hereof.
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19.

ADDITIONAL RENT; INSURANCE; INDEMNIFICATION. Tenant shall pay an amount equal to$100 per month, as

additional Ren~ to Landlord to reimburse Landlord for the estimated prorated property taxes and insurance. In additio~ Tenant shall
provide Landlord a commercial liability policy, with tenns and amounts approved by Landlord, covering the Premises and naming
Landlord as an additional insured, and loss payee. Tenant shall obtain any insurance coverage Tenant deems necessary to protect
Tenant and Tenant's property including all personal property on the Premis~ as to which the risk of loss shaU be borne by Tenant.
Landlord shaU not be liable for any damage or injury of or to the Tenant, Tenant's family, guests, invitees, agents or employees or to
any person entering the Premises or the building of which the Premises are a part or to goods or equipment, or in the structure or
equipment of the structure of which the Premises are a part, and Tenant hereby agrees to indemnify, defend and hold Landlord
hannless ftom any and all claims or assertions of every kind and nature.

~

20.
DEFAULT. lfTenant fails to comply with any of the material provisions of this Agreement, other than the covenant to pay
rent, or of any present rules and regulations or any that may be hereafter prescribed by Landlord, or materially fails to comply with
any duties imposed on Tenant by statute, within seven (7) days after delivery of written notice by Landlord specifying the noncompliance and indicating the intention of Landlord to tenninate the Lease by reason thereof, Landlord may terminate this Agreement.
If Tenant fails to pay rent when due and the default continues for seven (7) days thereafter, Landlord may, at Landlord's option,
declare the entire balance of rent payable hereunder to be immediately due and payable and may exercise any and all rights and
remedies available to Landlord at law or in equity or may immediately terminate this Agreement
21.
SMOKE DETECTORS/ SNOW REMOVAL. Tenant acknowledges the placement of smoke detectors in the Premises
and is familiar with how to verify the proper function of the smoke detectors. Tenant aclmowledges that the smoke detectors are in
good and operable condition and have tested the same. For the tenn of this Agreement, Tenant agrees to maintain the smoke detectors
and to keep new batteries in the smoke detectors and to ensure their proper function, in every way. Tenant hereby and forever releases
~ r d from and against any and all liabnity associated widt the proper operation of dte smoke detectors. Tenant initials~

Tenant understands and hereby accepts complete and total responsibility for snow and ice removal. Tenant further promises to keep
Tenant's own landings, sidewalks, stairs, and other places of common foot traffic on the premises safe and 'free ftom snow and ice.
Accordingly, Tenant hereby releases and holds Landlord, its owners, managers, Holdings staff: successors, assigns, and agents,
hannless from and against any and all liability associated with Tenant's personal health or personal property. Furthennore, Tenant
hereby indemnifies Landlord from~ '1~ ~ t any and all claims from third parties against Landlord related to the duties of Tenant
hereunder. Tenant initials )1lt\ /~ -

~

22.
ABANDONMENT. If at any time during the term of this Agreement Tenant abandons the Premises or any part thereof,
Landlord may, at Landlord's option, obtain possession of the Premises in the manner provided by law, and without becoming liable to
Tenant for damages or for any payment of any kind whatever. Landlord may, at Landlord's discretion, as agent for Tenant, relet the
Premises, or any part thereof, for the whole or any part thereot: for the whole or any part of the then llllexpired term, and may receive
and collect all rent payable by virtue of such reletting, and, at Landlord's option, hold Tenant liable for any difference between the rent
that would have been payable under this Agreement during the balance of the unexpire_d term, if this Agreement bad continued in
force, and the net rent for such period realized by Landlord by means of such reletting. If Landlord's right of reentry is exercised
following abandonment of the Premises by Tenant, then Landlord shall consider any personal property belonging to Tenant and left on
the Premises to also have been abandoned, in which case Landlord may dispose of all such personal property in any manner Landlord
shall deem proper and Landlord is hereby relieved of all liability for doing so.
23.
ATTORNEYS' FEES. Should it become necessary for Landlord to employ an attorney to enforce any of the conditions or
covenants hereof, including the collection of rentals or gaining possession of the Premises, Tenant agrees to pay all expenses so
incurred, including a reasonable attorneys' fee.
24.
RECORDING OF AGREEMENT. Tenant shall not record this Agreement on the Public Records of any public office. In
the event that Tenant shall record this Agreement, this Agreement shall, at Landlord's option, terminate immediately and Landlord
shall be entitled to all rights and remedies that it has at Jaw or in equity.

25.
GOVERNING LAW. This Agreement shall be governed, construed and interpreted by, through and under the Laws of the
State of Utah and venue shall be proper in Carbon County, Utah.
26.
SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this Agreement or the application thereof shall, for any reason and to any extent, be
invalid or unenforceable, neither the remainder of this Agreement nor the application of the provision to other persons, entities or
circumstances shall ~ affected thereby, but instead shall be enforced to the maximum extent permitted by law.
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BINDING EFFECT. The covenants, obligations and conditions herein contained shall be binding on and inure to the
benefit of the heirs, legal representatives, and assigns of the parties hereto.

27.

28.
DESCRIPTIVE HEADINGS. The descriptive headings used herein are for convenience of reference only and they are not
intended to have any affect whatsoever in determining the rights or obligations of the Landlord or Tenant
29.

CONSTRUCTION. The pronouns used herein shall include, where appropriate, either gender or both, sin:,oUlar and plural.

30.
NON-WAIVER. No indulgence, waiver, election or non-election by Landlord under this Agreement shall affect Tenant's
duties and liabilities hereunder. No failure of Landlord to enforce any term hereof shall be deemed a waiver, nor shall any acceptance
of a partial payment of rent be deemed a waiver of Landlord's right to the full amount thereof If any tenn, provision, covenant or
restriction of this Agreement is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, void or unenforceable, the remainder of the
tenns, provisions, covenants and restrictions of the Agreement shalt remain in full force and effect and shall in no way be affected,
impaired or invalidated.

~

31.
INTEGRATION; MODIFICATION. The parties hereby agree that this document contains the entire agreement between
the parties and this Agreement shall not be modified, changed. altered or amended in any way except through a written amendment
signed by all of the parties hereto.
32.
NOTICE. Any notice required or permitted under this Lease or under state law shall be deemed sufficiently given or served
if sent by United States certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed at the address of Landlord listed above, and to Tenant at the
address of Premises listed above. Landlord and Tenant shall each have the right from time to time to change the place notice is to be
given under this paragraph by written notice thereof to the other party.
33.
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS; DISCLOSURES. LANDLORD HAS NOT OCCUPIED THE PREMISES. TIIERE
MAY BE HAZARDOUS MATERIAL WHICH IS HARMFUL TO THE HEALTH AND WELLBEING OF THE TENANT USED
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OR OTHERWISE PRESENT IN THE PREMISES, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMJ1ED TO LEAD
PAINT, HARMFUL OR TOXIC MOLD, METHAMPHEDlME RESIDUE (OR OTHER HARMFUL CHEMICALS), BROKEN
GLASS, ETC. TENANT IS ENCOURAGED TO PERFORM ANY AND ALL INVESTIGATIONS DESIRED BY TENANT WITH
REGARD TO THE SAFETY AND CONDITION OF THE PREMISES PRIOR TOTAKING OCCUPANCY, AND IF TENANT
TAKES OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES, TENANT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT TENANT HAS PERFORMED ANY AND
ALL INVESTIGATIONS DESIRED AND HAS DETERMINED TIIAT TIIE PREMISES IS SAFE. ACCORDINGLY, TENANT
HEREBY RELEASES, ACQUITS AND FOREVER DISCHARGES LANDLORD, ITS PRINCIPALS, MEMBERS, AND
MANAGERS, SUCCESSOR OR ASSIGNS, OF AND FROM ANY AND ALL CLAIMS, ACTIONS, CAUSES OF ACTIONS,
PROMISES, CONTROVERSIES, DEMANDS, RIGHTS, CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES OR CLAIMS FOR OFFSETS, INTEREST,
OR FEES, WHETHER KNOWN OR UNKNOWN, THAT MAY ARISE FROM THE CONDffiON OF TIIE PREMISES OR THE
EFFECT OF THE PREMISES ON THE WELLBEING OF TENANT OR THEIR MINOR CHILDREN. FURTIIERMORE,
LANDLORD MAKES NO REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY AS TO THE FUNCTIONALITY OF ANY APPLIANCES OR
OTHER COMPONENT LOCATED ON THE PREMISES, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WASHER(S) AND DRYER(S),
SWAMP COOLERS, REFRIDERATOR, STOVE, DEADBOLTS (OR OTHER LOCKS), FIRE ALARMS, ETC.
FURTHERMORE, THE PREMISES MAY BE IN A FLOOD ZONE.
TENA.NT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TENANTS OWN SAFETY. TENANT IS HEREBY GIVEN NOTICE TO OBTAIN
PERSONAL RENTAL INSURANCE.
34.
RELEASE OF LIABILITY. For Ten ($10.00) Dollars and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency is hereby aclmowledged, and as a material inducement to Landlord to enter this Agreement, Tenant for themselves and
their heirs, successors and assigns. hereby releases, acquits and forever discharges Landlord, its principals, members, and managers,
successor or assigns, of and from any and all claims, actions, causes of actions, promises, controversies, demands, rights, claims for
damages or claims for offsets, interest, or fees, whether known or unkno~ that may arise ftom the Lease. This release is intended to
be a general and continuing release and it shall encompass all lO'lown and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen claims which the Tenant
may have against any of these parties. Furthermore, Tenant hereby waives any defenses, counter-claims, claims, or offsets against
Landlord.
.
35.
RIGHT TO SEEK COUNSEL. The undersigned Tenant acknowledges that they are advised to seek legal counsel before
signing this Agreement and they wanant that they either have sought such advice or wish to waive this protection. Consequently, the
undersigned, for themselves and their heirs, successors and assigns, agrees to be estopped ftom later claiming that they did not
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understand the meaning or implication of this agreement or claiming that it may be set aside or modified for any reason due to lack of
knowledge or Jegal counsel or upon any other theory.
36.
omoN TO PURCHASE. Provided Tenant is not in default hereunder, Tenant shall have the right to purchase ("Option")
the Premises for the Purchase Price of$126,TT5.00, ("Purchase Price") at any time after September 15, 2013 and before the end of the
Term of the Lease. As consideration for the Option, Tenant shall pay Landlord, a non-refundable option payment of $7,000.00
("Option Payment"), payable on or before the beginning of the Tenn, which shall be applied to the Purchase Price and shall be
counted toward the Earnest Money DeposiL In the event that Tenant exercises the Option to purchase the Premises, Tenant shall
execute a Promissory Note for the balance remaining on the Purchase Price, after the Option Payment has been applied, and the parties
shall close the transacti~n, as outlined in the Real Estate Purchase Contract, attached hereto as Exhibit "A", together with its
applicable amendments, and addenda.

1;;

LANDLORD: Richard E. Hardy

~
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

(;j

This Is a lagally bindlng Roal Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC"). Utah law requires real estato Hcens1tas to uso lhls form. Buyer ond Seller,
however, may agree to attar or delete It& provisions or to use 4 dffferenl form. If you doslro legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax
advisor.

OFFER TO PURCHASE AND EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT

On this~ day of
April
, 20..1!_ c·otter Reference Date")
Jeremy & Julie Montgomery
c·euyer")
offers lo purchase from
OWNER OF RECORD
C-Seller") the Property described below and
[
] delivers to the Buyer's Brokerage with this offer, or [
agrees to deliver no later than four (4) calendar days
after Acceptance (as defined In Section 23), Earnest Money in the amount of S
7,000.00
in the form
of
CHECK
• After Acceptance of the REPC by Buyer and Seifer, and receipt of the
Earnest Money by the Brokerage, the Brokerage shall have four (4) calendar days in which to deposit the Earnest Money
into the Brokerage Real Estate Trust Accounl

x)

Buyer's Brokerage __________
NJ._'_________
A
Phone: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Received by: _,..,_._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (Date)
(Signature above aeknowledges receipt of Earnest Money)

OTHER PROVISIONS
1. PROPERTY: Tax ID No.: 02-0223-0000
also described as: _2_044
__
W_4_30_0_N_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
City of
Helper
, County of
Carbon
State of Utah, Zip
84526
(the "Property").
Any reference below to the term "Property'" shall include the Property described above, together with the Included Items and
water rights/water shares, if any, referenced in Sections 1. 1. 1.2 and 1.4.
1.1 Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the followlng items if presently owned and in place
on the Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ovens, ranges and hoods; cook tops;
dishwashers; ceiling fans: water heaters: light fixtures and bulbs: bathroom fixtures and bathroom mirrors; curtains,
draperies, rods, window blinds and shutters: window and door screens; stonn doors and windows; awnings; satellite dishes;
affaxed carpets; automatic garage door openers and accompanying transmitters; security system: fencing and any
landscaping.
1.2 Other Included Items. The following items that are presendy owned and in place on the Property have been left
for the convenience of the parties and are also included in this sale (check applicable box): [ ] washers [ ] dryers
[ Jrefrigerators [ ] water softeners [ ) microwave ovens (
other (specify) Downstairs refrigerator and

x)

downstairs freezer, Amana refrigerator. Whirlpool glass top stove and microwave.
The above checked items shall be conveyed to Buyer under separate bUI of sale with warranties as to titte.
1.3 Excluded Items. The following items are excluded from this sate: _N_O_N_E;;;.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1.4 Water Service. The Purchase Price forthe Property shall include all water rights/water shares, if any. that are the
legal source for Seller's current culinary water service and irrigation waler service, if any. to the Property. The water
rights/water shares will be conveyed or otherwise transferred to Buyer at Closing by applicable deed or legal instruments.
The following water rights/water shares, if applicable, are specifically excluded from this sale: Notwithstanding the
foregoing, Seller shall convey 1 share of Spring Glen Canal Water.
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for the Property is S
126,nS.00
. Except as provided in this
Section, Iha Purchase Price shall be paid as provided in Sections 2(a) through 2{d) below. Any amounts shown in 2(b) and
2(d) may be adjusted as deemed neces~ry by Buyer and the Lender.
$ _ _ _...;7_,,~o_o_o_._DD_

S
~

S

119,n5.00

(d) Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement

S

S

Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described in the REPC, this deposit may
become totally non refundable.
(b) New Loan. Buyer may apply for mortgage loan fmencing (the •Loan•) on terms acceptable to
Buyer: If an FHA/VA loan applies, see attached FHANA Loan Addendum.
(c) Seller Financing {see attached Seller Financing Addendum)

(a)

126,nS.00
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3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING.
3.1
SelUemenl Settlement shall take place no later than the SelUement Deadline referenced in Section 24{d), or as
otherwise mutually agreed by Buyer and Seller in writing. ·setUemenr shall occur only when all of the following have been
completed: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered lo each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents
required by the REPC. by the Lender, by the title insurance and escrow/closing offices. by written escrow instructions
(including any split closing instructions. if applicable), or by applicable law: (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer or
Seifer under these documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer or Seller to the
other party, or to lhe escrow/closing office, in the form of cash. wire transfer. cashier's check. or other form acceptable to
the escrow/closing office.
3.2
Prorations. All prorations. including, but not 6mited to, homeowne(s association dues, property taxes for the
current year. rents, and interest on assumed obligations. lf any, shall be made as of the Settlement Deadline referenced In
Section 24(d), unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties. Such writing could include the settlement statemenL The
provisions-of this Section 3.2 shall survive Closing.
3.3 Special Assessments. Any assessments for capital improvements as approved by the HOA (pursuant to HOA
governing documents) or as assessed by a municipality or special improvement district. prior to the SeWement Deadline
shall be pald for by: [ ] Seller ( ] Buyer IX] Split Equally Between Buyer and Seller [ ] Other (explain) _ _ __
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · The provisions of this Section 3.3 shall survive
Closing.
3.4 Fees/Costs/Payment Obligations. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing. Seller and Buyer shall each pay onehalf (1/2) of the fee charged by the escrow/closing office for its services In the settlement/closing process. Tenant deposits
(including. but not limited to, security deposits, cleaning deposits and prepaid rents) shall be pafd or credited by Seller to
Buyer at Settlement Buyer agrees to be responsible for homeowners• association and private and publ!c utility service
transfer fees. if any, and all utilities and other services provided to the Property after the Settlement Deadline. The
escrow/c!oslng office is authorized and directed to withhold from Selle(s proceeds at Closing, sufficient funds to pay off on
Seller's behalf all mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and warrants. The provisions of this
Section 3.4 shall survive Closing.
3.5 Closing. For purposes of the REPC, ·crosing· means that: (a) Settlement has been completed: (b) the proceeds
of any new loan have been delivered by the Lender to Seller or lo the escrow/closing office; and (c) the applicable Closing
documents have been recorded in the office of the county recorder. The actions described In 3.5 (b) and (c) shell be
completed withtn four calendar days after SettJemenL
4. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver physical possession of the Property to Buyer as follows: [X) Upon Closing:
[ ] _ Hours after Closing; [ ] _ Calendar Days after Closing. Any contracted rental of the Property prior to or after
Closing. between Buyer and SeDer. shaD be by separate written agreement. Seller and Buyer shaU each be responsible for
any Insurance coverage each party deems necessary for the Property including any personal property and belongings.
Seller agrees to deliver the Property to Buyer in broom-clean condition and free of debris and personal belongings. Any
Seller or tenant moving-related damage to the Property shall be repaired at Seller's expense. The provisions of this Section
4 shall survive Closing.
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. Buyer and Seifer acknowledge prior written receipt of agency
disclosure provided by their respective agent that has disclosed the agency relationships confirmed below. At the signing
of the REPC:

Seller's Agent

NIA

represents [

] Seller [ X] both Buyer and Seller as a Limited Agent;

Seller's Brokerage

NIA

, represents [

] Seller [ X] both Buyer and Seifer as a Umlted Agent;

Buyer's Agent

NIA

, represents [

] Buyer [X ] both Buyer and Seller as a Limited Agent;

Buyer's Brokerage

NIA

• represents [

] Buyer [

x ] both Buyer and Seller as a Limited AgenL

~

6. TITLE & TITLE INSURANCE.
6.1
Title to Property. Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property and will convey marketable tiUa to
the Property to Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer does agree to accept title to the Property subject to the
contents of the Commitment for Tille Insurance (the ·commitment•) provided by Seller under Section 7. and as reviewed
and approved by Buyer under Section 8. Buyer also agrees to accept title to the Property subject to any existing leases.
rental and property management agreements affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing which were provided to
Buyer pursuant to Section 7(e). The provisions of this Section 6.1 shall survive Closing.
6.2 Title Insurance. At Settlement, Sellar agrees to pay for and cause to b8 issued in favor of Buyer, lhrough the
title insurance agency that issued the Commitment (the "Issuing Agent"), the most current version of the ALTA
Homeowners Polley of Title Insurance (the "Homeowner"s Policy'). If the Homeowners Policy is not available through the
Issuing Agent. Buyer and Seller further agree as foUows: (a) Seller agrees to pay for the Homeowners Policy if available
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through any other title insurance agency selected by Buyer; (b) if the Homeowners Polley is not available either through the
Issuing Agent or any other title insurance agency, then Seiter agrees to pay for. and Buyer agrees to accept. the most
current avaHable version of an ALTA Owner's Policy of Title Insurance ("Standard Coverage Owner's Policy") available
through the Issuing Agent.
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(a), Seller shall provide
to Buyer the following documents in hard copy or electronic format which are coUeclively referred to as the "Seller
Disclosures·:

(a) a written Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, completed, signed and dated by Seller as provided in
Section10.3:
(b) a Commitment for Tdle Insurance as referenced in Section 6;
(c) a copy of any restrictive covenants (CC&R's), rules and regulations affecting the Property;
(d) a copy or the most recent minutes. budget and financial statement for the homeowners· association. if any;
(e) a copy of any lease, rental, and property management agreements affecllng the Property not expiring prior to Closing;
(f) evidence of any waler rights and/or water shares referenced in Section 1.4:
(g) written notice of any claims and/or condiUons known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or zoning
code violations: and
(h) Other(specify)..:.N=O~N;:.::E=----------------------------8.

BUYER'S CONDITIONS OF PURCHASE.
8.1
DUE DILIGENCE CONDmON. Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property: [

] IS [X] IS NOT conditioned
upon Buyer's Due Diligence as defined in this Section 8.1 (a) below. This condition is referred to as the "Due DDigence
Condition.• If checked in the affirmative, Sections 8.1 (a) through 8.1 (c) apply; otherwise they do not.
(a) Due Diligence Items. Buyer's Due Dingence shall consist of Buyer's review and approval of the contents of
the Seller Disclosures referenced in Sec\Jon 7, and any other tests. evaluations and verificatfons of the Property deemed
necessary or appropriate by Buyer, such as: the physical condition of the Property: the existence of any hazardous
substances, environmental issues or geologic condiUons; the square footage or acreage of the land and/or improvements:
the condition of the roof. walls. and foundation; the condition of the plumbing, electrical, mechanical, heating and air
conditioning systems and fixtures: the condition of all appliances; the costs and availability of homeowners• insurance and
flood insurance. if applicable; water source. availability and quality; the location of property tines: regulatory use resbicUons
or violations; fees for services such as HOA dues. municipal services, and utility costs: convicted sex offenders residing in
proximity to the Property; and any other matters deemed material to Buyer in making a decision to purchase the Property.
Unless otherwise provided in the REPC, all of Buyer's Due Diligence shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with Buyefs Due Diligence. Buyer agrees to pay for any
damage to the Property resulting from any such Inspections or tests during the Due Diligence.
(b) Buyer's Right to cancel or Resolve Objections. If Buyer determines. in Buyer's sole discretion, that the
results of the Due DIiigence are unacceptable. Buyer may either: (i) no later than the Due Diligence Deadline referenced in
Section 24(b). cancel the REPC by providing written notice to Seifer. whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shaU be
released to Buyer without the requirement of further written authorization from Seller; or (ii) no later than the Due Dillgence
Deadline referenced in Section 24(b), resolve in writtng with Seller any objections Buyer has arising from Buyer's Due
Diligence.
(c) Failure to Cancel or Resolve Objections. If Buyer fails to cancel the REPC or fails to resolve in writing any
objections Buyer has arising from Buyer·s Due Diligence. as provided In Section 8.1(b), Buyer shall be deemed to have
waived the Due Diligence Condition.
8.2 APPRAISAL CONDITION. Buyer's obligatlon to purchase the Property: [ ] IS IX] IS NOT conditioned upon
the Property appraising for not less than the Purchase Price. This condition is referred to as the •Appraisal Condition: If
checked in the affirmative. Seclfons 8.2(a) and 8.2(b) apply: otherwise they do not.
(a) Buyer's Right to Cancel. If after completion of an appraisal by a llcensed appraiser. Buyer receives written
notice from the Lender or the appraiser that the Property has appraised for less than the Purchase Price (a "Notice of
Appraised Value1. Buyer may cancel the REPC by providing written notice to Seller (with a copy of the Notice of Appraised
Value) no later than the Financing & Appraisal Deadline referenced in Section 24(c): whereupon the Earnest Money
Deposit shall be released to Buyer without the requirement of further written authorization from Seller.
{b) Failure to Cancel. If the REPC is not cancetled as provided in this section 8.2. Buyer shall be deemed to have
waived the Appraisal condition.
8.3 FINANCING CONDITION. Buyer's obligation to purchase the property: [ ) IS (X] IS NOT condltioned upon
Buyer obtaining the Loan rererenced In Section 2(b). This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition.• If checked
in the affirmative. Sections 8.3(a) and 8.3(b) apply; otherwise they do nol If the Financing Condition applies. Buyer agrees
to work diligently and in good faith to obtain the Loan.
Page 3 of 6 pages

Buyer's Initials _ _ _ _ _ _ Date _ _ _ _ Seller's Initials _ _ _ _ _ _ Date _ _ __

- ·--- ··---·-·--------------------

.. ·- ..... ··-·· .
..
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

management agreements shall be made: (b) no new lease, rental or property management agreements shall be entered
into: (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or undertaken: {d) no further financial
encumbrances to the Property shall be made, and (e) no changes In the legal title to the Property shall be made.
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estale, limlted liability company or
other entity, the person signing the REPC on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer an Seller.

14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. The REPC together with Its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures
(collectively referred to as the ..REPC"), constitutes the entire contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces
any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties whether verbal
or otherwise. The REPC cannot be changed except by written agreement of the partfes.
15. MEDIATION. Any dispute relating to the REPC arising prior to or after Closing: [ ] SHALL [XI MAY AT THE OPTION
OF THE PARTIES first be submitted to mediation. Mediation is a process In which the parties meet with an impartial person
who helps lo resolve the dispute informally and confidenliatly. Mediators cannot impose binding decisions. The parties to
the dispute must agree before any settlement is binding. The parties will jointly appoint an acceptable mediator and share
equaUy in the cost of such mediation. If mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under the REPC shall
apply. Notbing In this S~on 15 prohibits any party from seeking emergency legal or equitable relief, pending mediation.
The provisions of this Section 15 shall survive Closing.

16. DEFAULT.
16.1 Buyer Defaull If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect one of the following remedies: (a) cancel the REPC and retain
the Earnest Money Deposit, or Deposits, if applicable, as liquidated damages: (b) maintain the Earnest Money Deposit. or
Deposits, if applicable, in trust and sue Buyer to specifically enforce the REPC; or (c) retum the Eamest Money Deposit, or
Deposits. if applicable, to Buyer and pursue any other remedies avaUable at law.
16.2 Seller Default. If Seller defaults, Buyer may elect one of the following remedies: (a) cancel the REPC, and in
addition to the return of the Eamest Money Deposit. or Deposits. if applicable, Buyer may elect to accept from Seller, as
liquidated damages, a sum equal to the Eamest Money Deposit. or Deposits. if applicable; or (b) maintain the Earnest
Money Deposit. or Deposits, if applicable, In trust and sue Seller to specifically enforce the REPC; or (c) accept a return of
the Earnest Money Deposit, or Deposits, if applicable. and pursue any other remedies available at law. If Buyer elects to
accept 1iquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand.
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS/GOVERNING LAW. In the event of litigation or binding arbitraUon to enforce the
REPC. the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees shall not be
awarded for participation in mediation under Section 15. This contract shall be governed by and construed in accordance
with the Jaws of the State of Utah. The provisions of this Section 17 shall survive Closing.
18. NOTICES. Except as provided In Section 23, all notices required under the REPC must be: (a) in writing: (b) signed by
the Buyer or Seller giving notice; and (c) received by the Buyer or the Seller, or their respective agent. or by the brokerage
finn representing the Buyer or Seller, no later than the applicable date referenced in the REPC.
19. NO ASSIGNMENT. The REPC and the rights and obligations of Buyer hereunder, are personal to Buyer. The REPC
may nol be assigned by Buyer without the prior written consent of Seller. Provided, however, the transfer of Buye(s interest
in the REPC to any business entity in which Buyer holds a legal interest, including. but not limited to, a family partnership,
family trust, limited liability company, partnership, or corporaUon (collectively referred to as a ·Permissible Transfer'"). shall
not be treated as an assignment by Buyer that requires Seller's prior written consent Furthermore. the inclusion of "and/or
assigns• or similar language on the line identifying Buyer on the first page of the REPC shall consUtute Seller's written
consent only to a Permissible Transfer.
20. INSURANCE & RISK OF LOSS.
20.1 Insurance Coverage. As of Closing, Buyer shall be responsible to obtaln casualty and liability insurance
coverage on the Property in amounts acceptable to Buyer and Buyer's Lender, if applicable.

20.2 Risk of Loss. If prior to Closing, any part of the Property is damaged or destroyed by fire. vandalism, flood,
earthquake. or act of God, the risk of such loss or damage shall be home by Seller: provided however, that if the cost of
repairing such toss or damage would exceed ten percent (10%) of the Purchase P~ce referenced in Section 2, either Seller
or Buyer may elect to cancel the REPC by providing written notice lo the other party, in which instance the Earnest Money
Deposit, or Deposits, if applicable, shall be relumed to Buyer.
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in the REPC. Extensions must be
agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise expticitly stated in the REPC: (a) performance under each Section of
the REPC which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PM Mountain rune on the stated date; and (b) the
term •days• and •calendar days• shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event
which triggers the timing requirement (e.g. Acceptance). Performance dates and times referenced herein shall not be
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binding upon title companies, lenders. appraisers and others not parties to the REPC, except as otherwise agreed to in
writing by such non-party.
22. ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Eleclronic transmission (including email and fax) of a signed
copy of the REPC, any addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed electronic transmission shall be
the same as delivery of an original The REPC and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts.
23. ACCEPTANCE. ·Acceptance· occurs only when an of the following have occurred: (a) Seller or Buyer has signed the
offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance: and (b) Seller or Buyer or their agent has communicated to the
other party or to the other party's agent lhal the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to Iha REPC:

~

(a) Seller Disclosure Deadline

NIA

(Date)

(b) Due Dffigence Deadline

NIA

(Date)

(c) Financing & Appraisal Deadline

NIA

(Date)

(d) Settlement DeadUne

See Addendum 1

(Date)

25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions.
5:00
[ ) AM [X) PM Mountain Time on
April 17. 2013
If Seller does not accept this offer by:
(Dale), this offer shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return any Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer.
(Offer Date)

(Buyer's Signature)

ij)

(Offer Date)

{Buyer's Signature)

(Buyer's Names) (PLEASE PRINT)

(Notice Address)

(Zip Code)

(Phone)

(Buyer's Names) (PLEASE PRINT)

(Notice Address)

(Zip Code)

(Phone)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
[ ] ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified

above.
( ] COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer"s Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or
modifications as specified In the attached ADDENDUM NO. _ _ ___
( JREJECTION: Seller rejects the foregoing offer.

(Seller's Signature)

(Date) (Time)

(Date)· (Time)

(Seller's Signature)

(Seller's Names) (PLEASE PRINT)

(Notice Address)

(Zip Code)

(Phone)

(Seller's Names) (PLEASE PRINT)

(Notice Address)

(Zip Code)

(Phone)

GiJ>

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMM1SStON AND THE omcE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL.
EFFECTNE AUGUST 27 •
AS OF JANUARY ,. 2009, IT WILL REPLACE AND SUPERSEDE THE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSION 05' THIS FORM.
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SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM

TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS SELLER FINANCING ADD OUM is made a part of that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPCj with .
an Offer Reference Date of
1I~
--;;- e1 •'3
between
p\o}9t:a6~'\ as Buyer, and _
as Seller, regarding the Property
located at £01/'{ 16,) Y:3oo ~
t:tfac?efZ: u, h:-S
The terms of this ADDENDUM are hereby
incorporated as part of the REPC.

__...u..::::.z::.J~1--------------a:'° .

~~CREDIT DOCUMENTS.

Seller's extension of credit to Buyer shall be evidenced by: [ ] Note and Deed of Trust

L1'-J Note and All-Inclusive Deed of Trust [ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

2. CREDIT TERM-Cl. The terms of the credit documents referred to in Section 1 above are as follows:
S//l'f_,77S: 1:' (.c~~ principal amount of the note (the •1Notej; Interest at .:.,. 'l '> % per annum; payable at approximately $
·.1"00 . per ("\~'M
. The entire unpaid 1>§1'Jl~Gof principal plus accrued interest is due i n ~ months from date
of the N~e. Rrst payment due ~PM\ c,;. ~ ~orill principal payments. balloon payments or other terms as follows:

t'J,:.':'..~!!;. ;; ';; , ~

l•O?-'

1

The creaJt documents referenced in Section 1 of this ADDENDUM will contain a due-on-sale clause in favor of Seller. Seifer
agrees to provide to Buyer at Settlement (a) an amortization schedule based on the above terms; (b) a written dlscfosure of
the total interest Buyer will pay to maturity of the Note; and (c) the annual percentage rate on the Note based on loan closing

~

costs.
3. TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. Buyer shall also be responsible for: (a) property taxes; (b) homeowners association dues;
(c) special assessments; and (d) hazard insurance premiums on the Property. These specific obfigations will be paid: [1(1
directly to Seller/Escrow Agent on a monthly basis [ ] directly to the appllcable county treasurer, association. and
insurance company as required by those entities.
4. PAYMENT. Buyer's payments under Section 2 above will be made to: ( ] Seller [ XI an Escrow Agent If an Escrow
Agent. T0 p
wm act as Escrow Agent and will be responsible for disbursing payments on any
underlying mortgage or deed of trust {the Aunderlying mortgage@) and to the SeUer. Cost of setting up and maintaining the
escrow account shall be paid by: DQ Buyer [ ] Seller [ ] split evenly between the parties.
5. LATE PAYMENTIPREPAYMENT. Any payment not made within_§__ days after it is due is subjed to a late charge of$
J{) ~ or JO % of the installment due, whichever is greater. Amounts in default shall bear Interest at a rate of
.11:.. % per annum. All or part of the principal balance on the Note may be paid prior to maturity without penalty.

6. DUE-ON.SALE. As part of the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7 ofthe REPC. SeUer shall provide to Buyer a copy
of the underlying mortgage, the note secured thereby, and the amortization schedule. Buyer::s obligation to purchase under
this Contract is conditioned upon Buyer=s approval of the content of those documents. In accordance with Section 8 of the
REPC. If the holder of the underlying mortgage calls the loan due as a result of this transaction, Buyer agrees to discharge the
underlying loan as required by the mortgage lender. In such event, Seller=s remaining equity shall be paid as provided in the
credit documents.
7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provided to Seller, as a required part of this ADDENDUM, the attached Buyer

Financial Information Sheet Buyer may use the Buyer Financial Information Sheet approved by the Real Estate Commission
and the Attomey General=S Office, or may provide comparable written infonnation in a different format. together with such
additional infonnation as Seller may reasonably require. Buyer [ ] WILL [)Cl WILL NOT provide Seller with copies of IRS
returns for the two preceding tax years. Buyer acknowledges that Seller may contact Buyer's current employer for verification
of employment as represented by Buyer in the Buyer Financial Information Sheet.
8. SELLER APPROVAL By the Seller Disclosure DeadHne referenced fn Section 24(a) of the REPC. Buyer shall provide to
Seller, at Buyer's expense. a current credit report on Buyer from a consumer credit reporting agency. SeUermay use the cred"lt
report and the information referenced in Section 7 of this Addendum ("Buyer Disclosures..) to review and evaluate the crecratworlhlness of Buyer rSetler's Review").
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8.1 Seller Review. If Seller determines, in Selle(s sole discretion, that the results of the Sellers Review are
unacceptable, Seller may either: (a) no later than the Due Diligence Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) of the REPC, cancel
the REPC by providing written notice to Buyer, whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shaU be released to Buyer without the
requirement of further written authorization from Seller: or (b) no later than the Due Difigence Deadfme referenced in Section
24(b), resolve in writing with Buyer any objections Seirer has arising from Seller's Review.
8.2 Failure to Cancel or Resolve Objections. If Seller fails to cancel the REPC or resolve in wrtting any objections Seller
has arising from Selfer's Review. as provided in Section 8.1 of this ADDENDUM. Seller shall be deemed to have waived the
Seller=s Review.
9. TITLE INSURANCE. Buyer ( ] SHALL (XI SHALL NOT provide to Seiler a fender=s policy of title insurance in the amount
of the indebtedness to the Seifer. and shall pay for such policy at Settlement
10. DISCLOSURE OFTAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS. By no later than Sefflement. Buyer and Seller shall disclose to
each other their respective Social Security Numbers or other applicable tax identification numbels so that they may comply with
federal laws on reporting mortgage Interest in fi6ngs wHh the Internal Revenue Service.
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, Including all prior addenda and
counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, not
modified by. this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [>(] Seifer [ ] Buyer shall have until S: ob
[ JAM p(] PM
Mountain Time on
11 ;JD i9
(Date), to accept the terms of this SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM fn
accordance with Sectln23 of the ~EPC. Unress so accepted, the offer as set forth in this SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM
shall lapse.

~u..

[ ] Buyer [ ] Seirer Signature

(Date) (Time)

Socfal Security Number

[ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature

(Date) (Time)

Social Security Number

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION

CHECK ONE:
[

]ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts these terms.

[ ]COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms set forth on the attached ADDENDUM NO.
0j

--·
[ ]REJECTION: [ ] Seller [

JBuyer rejects the foregoing SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Date) (Tfme)

(Slgnature)

(Date) (Time)

(Signature)

(Date) (Time)

(Signature)

(Date) (Time)

TI{JS FORM APPROVED BY lHE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH AnORNEY GENERAL.
EffECTIVE AUGUST %1, 2008. AS OF JANUARY 1. 2CG9, IT WILL REPLACE AND SUPERSEDE THE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSION OF THIS
FORM.
'·
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The Law Office or

Tyler A. Woodworth, P.C.
1436 S. Legend H·ills Drive, Suite 325
Clearfield, UT 84015
September 20, 2013
Jeremy Montgomery

2044 W 4300 N
Helper, Utah 84526

Re: Lease Agreement
Mr. Montgomery:

•
•

•

I am writing on behalf of Mr. Richard Hardy regarding the lease agreement he entered into
with you on April 17, 2013. As of September 15, 2013 you have the ability to exercise an option to
purchase the residence. I am writing to Inform you that if you decide to purchase the property, you
will need to find financing to purchase the property for the agreed upon amount of $126,775.00.
Mr. Hardy wanted to provide you sufficient time to acquire the necessary funds for the purchase of
the home. Mr. Hardy however, is not interested in financing the purchase of this property, especially
where you have been late in previous months {May, June, July) and have failed to pay late fees as
agreed In your lease agreement. Mr. Wetdy bears no contractual (or other) obligation to finance the
purchase of the property. The Real Estate Purchase Contract referenced in the agreement was never
executed or signed and paragraph 31 of the lease agreement clearly states that the entire
agreement is contained in the lease agreement and any additional agreement must be signed by all
of the parties. Please make the appropriate financing arrangements with your bank or other
financial institution If you intend to purchase the property.
'
Please be advised that this letter is also formal notice that you are in material breach of
provision 2 of the lease agreement, which requires you to pay a 10% late fee ($70) for rents more
than five days late. You did not send your rent payment for May until the 13th, and June until the
24th of June, 14 days after it was due, without paying the applicable late fee. In addition to the late
fees, the agreement states in provision 2 that you are required to pay Mr. Hardy $10.00 per day as
liquidated damages until all late fees are paid in full. Starting on May 11th you owe Mr. Hardy more
than 18 weeks in liquidated damages, which means you owe more than ($10/day x 126 days} $1260
in damages to Mr. Hardy. Please be advised that this notice as provided under provision 20, gives
Mr. Hardy the option to terminate the entire agreement at his discretion lf you fail to remedy the
breach of contract by paying all associated late fees and damages within 7 days of this notice.
If you have any questions I would advise you to ask your own attorney. Please be aware
that if Mr. Hardy decides to enforce his rights by taking legal action for late fees and damages,
paragraph 23 provides that you wlll be responsible for Mr. Hardy's attorney's fee for having to
enforce any of the conditions ef the agreement. Understand that if you contact Mr. Hardy, he will
refer you to me, so I would ask that your attorney contact me with your intentions and how you
propose on remedying the situation. (see my contact information above)
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